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From Confrontation to Coopetition in the
Globalized Semiconductor Industry. 




This Research Memorandum is an update on Memorandum FEW 733
dated 23 July 1996. Comparing the two manuscripts next
differences are striking. 
First, the present paper provides the arguments as succinctly
as possible. Secondly some brand new paragraphs have been
included on the role of original equipment manufacturing,
licensing and cross licensing, the patent paradox, the
productivity paradox and the evaluation of strategic trade
policy. Moreover research consortia in Japan and the European
Union have been dealt with. Finally the present situation has
been brought more up to date while elaborating on the
positions of Europe, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and China.
Briefly, the former paper has undergone a complete
restructuring. 
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Paper Abstract.   
The silicon chip is not only a symbol of marvellous
technologies that are transforming industrial production and
leisure time in society, but also of trade and technology
conflicts while at the same time offering the potential for
cooperation. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the semiconductor
industry has moved from being highly confrontational to being
much more cooperative as is evidenced by the emergence of
cross-national strategic alliances between companies, spanning
R&D, product development, production and distribution.
Over the last 15 years the semiconductor industry has
experienced startling reversals of competitive fortune in
which the USA dominated in 1970s, then Japan entered in 1980s,
and in 1986 surpassed the USA as the largest producer of
semiconductors with most US firms abandoning DRAM production
due to price competition. This reversal of market position has
become known as the X-curve . Since the early 1990s the
Americans are on top again but with the Koreans and the
Taiwanese coming on fast. With China and perhaps India coming
on line in the present decade or so, these reversals in
competitiveness will continue to play themselves out in the
market.
Due to external economies and spillover effects for other
industries, this industry is considered to be a strategic
sector, not only in the USA, where the industry came into
existence, but also in Japan and Europe.
Observing the excessive returns earned initially in this
industry in the USA, Japanese companies wanted to shift these
profits, at least in part, to Japan, for which the Japanese
government provided support. 
The closing of the Japanese market both to imports and foreign
direct investment undermined the initial American competitive
strength.
In order to counteract the loss of competitiveness the US
industry reacted, besides by restructuring, by creating, with
government funding, the research consortium SEMATECH, while
the American government responded by concluding since 1986
bilateral trade agreements with Japan in which Japan initially
agreed to "voluntarily" restrict its exports of semiconductors
and to "voluntarily" expand the imports of American chips. 
In the mid-1980s Europe was a marginal player in the global
competitive battle and suffered dependence on the USA and
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Japan. This was a consequence of decisions taken by European
firms but part also lies in the fragmentation of the European
market and the policy pursued by the European governments.
Europe survived through protected markets and was dependent on
subsidies. The conventional wisdom was for Europe to give up
on semiconductors. But this was not the situation by the end
of the 1990s. 
Today Europe is becoming a major force in the global
information age economy. In 1998 three European semiconductor
firms were in the worldwide Top 10. The European semiconductor
industry shows faster growth rates than international
competitors and is more profitable than the industry average.
Europe is leading in the development of next generation
technology and is dominant in several key global applications
markets.
Japan continues to fight neck-and-neck with the USA for number
one position, but their cumulative weight will progressively
decrease and Asia/Pacific (Korea) may overtake Europe to
become third largest chip producer.
The exhorbitant high R&D cost to develop new generations of
semiconductors has forced producers all of the world to form
strategic alliances in order to set standards. This implies
that the industry has become truely globalized. The emergence
of successful global alliances has the potential to shift
competition away from the current, predominantly nationalistic
focus to a struggle among competing global partnerships.
If relationships of this sort prosper, then at least one
Japanese-American trade sore may have healed itself. 
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1. Technological Characteristics: DRAMs and EPROMs.
Semiconductors are an unseen part of our everyday life. 
They are intermediate goods, critical to the operation of
virtually all electronics and used in the production of
computers, consumer electronics, capital goods and a host of
other products from automatic coffee makers, toasters, anti-
lock brake systems and cellular phones to the computer.
They are often referred to as "the crude oil of the
information age" and will fuel our economy into the 21st
century. 
Semiconductors are fingernail-sized electronic circuits that
process, store and move information. The technique of
production involves etching of circuits on silicon wafers (a
wafer is a thin, highly polished silicon crystal disk) by a
combination of photographic techniques ("masking") and
chemical baths, followed by baking, cutting into dice, sealing
and packaging. It might be said that the information highway
is paved with silicon.
For a chip to work, everything - temperature, timing, density
of solutions, vibration levels, dust - must be precisely
controlled. The physics of this process is not entirely
understood so that manufacturing involves a trial and error
process, giving rise to learning by doing. Semiconductor
manufacturing today is a costly, fragmented and inefficient
process that takes place in three stages: material processing,
wafer fabrication, and assembly and test. The production
process is a lengthy process, typically two to three months,
from the beginning of chip fabrication to the sale to the
final consumer.
Technological progress leads to generations with increased
information storage capacity (taken as product innovation) and
to production processes characterized by smaller design rules
(taken as process innovations). The yield, i.e. the percentage
of chips that are free from defect and thus can be sold on the
market, is very low when starting production, but improves
while learning. 
The smaller the design rule, the more memory cells may be
placed on a given area, with the effect of increasing the
total number of chips of a given memory capacity on a wafer.
The US was the leader in design technology, while Japan was
the leader in process technology. 
The improvement of performance is known as the Law of Moore ,
one of the founders of Intel, which claims that memory
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capacity doubles every 18 months as a result of technological
progress. Figure 1 illustrates Moore's Law. However, within a
few years the generations of microchips will probably succeed
each other less rapidly so that the Law of Moore might be
blocked. 
One way to increase productivity and lower the cost per chip,
while allowing chip sizes to increase, is to increase the size
(diameter) of the wafer. The semiconductor industry only
recently moved from 150-mm wafers to 200-mm wafers and is now
considering moving to 300-mm wafers which yield more than
double the number of chips of a 200-mm wafer. Today's Pentium
Pro micro-processor contains more than five million
transistors.
Moving to larger wafer sizes, while imperative from a
productivity standpoint, will antiquate existing manufacturing
technologies and facilities. The transition to 12-inch wafers
is estimated to cost equipment makers and materials suppliers
more than $21 billion.
The basic breakdown of semiconductors is into integrated
circuits, which is the largest product line, discrete devices
and optoelectronic devices.
Much of the international trade dispute in semiconductors
centred on memory chips, in which a distinction can be made
between commodity chips (DRAMs) and specialty chips (EPROMs). 
DRAMs, Dynamic Random Access Memories, are a volatile device.
They temporarily store a large amount of data or instructions;
a DRAM is a volatile chip, the memory disappears when power is
turned off. 
EPROMs, Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, are a non-
volatile memory chip. They store data more permanently. In
ROMs the memory content is loaded during the manufacturing
stage, performing only reading operations, e.g. a fixed
program in a pocket calculator.
It preserves the memory content also when power is switched
off.
This distinction between DRAMs and EPROMs fits within the
present trend toward commoditization and customization.  
The storage capacity of DRAMs quadrupples with each new
generation (1K, 4K, 16K, 64K, 256K, 1M, 4M, 16M, etc.), which
comes out every 3 years. In 1997 the takeover of 4 Mb DRAM by
16Mb as the mainstream product occurred and in just two years
16 Mb DRAM gave in to 64Mb which became the mainstream product
in 1999. For EPROMs the storage capacity doubles with each new
generation (4K, 8K, 16K etc.), which comes out every 18
months. 
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The DRAM market is larger than the EPROM market. Price
competition is more intense in DRAMs. DRAM costs are mainly
determined by current output and economies of scale. 
The EPROM market offers more scope for product
differentiation. EPROM costs are determined mainly by
cumulative output and learning by doing.  
Generally, DRAMS have a lower per-bit price than EPROMs. 
Due to high switching costs EPROMs of older generations are
still in demand even if new generations are already on the
market. The demand for DRAMs is biased towards the latest
generation. Access to-state-of-the-art technology is critical
to successful competition.
Market success for EPROMs depends on design and performance
more than on low production cost. 
Both large fixed costs and learning by doing imply that only a
few producing firms can survive. However, continuous
innovations offset this and allow small start-up firms to
enter. 
A key transition within DRAMs or EPROMs occurs when cost per
bit becomes equivalent for adjacent generations. 
This leads to the demise of an old generation.
Flash memory  may be considered to be a disruptive technology.
It is the fastest growing and most closely watched IC product
segment which is expected more than double in 2000 to $10
billion and is forecast to account for 21 percent of the total
memory market in 2000, up from 14 percent in 1999. It differs
from conventional DRAM technology in that the chip retains the
data even when the power is off, what is ideal for hand-held
computers and digital cameras. Flash chips consume less than 5
percent of the power that a disk drive of equivalent capacity
would consume. The disadvantage is that depending on the
amount of memory, the cost per megabyte of flash can be
between five and fifty times greater than disk memory. They
can only be overwritten a few hunderd thousand times before
wearing out, rather than a few million times for disk drives.
They are used in cellular phones, heart monitoring devices,
modems and industrial robots. 
Not only are unit shipments of cellular phones exploding
(forecast to be 430 million units in 2000), but the amount of
flash memory per cell phone is roughly doubling each year.
Cell phones built in 1998 had an average of 4Mb of flash
memory. By 2002, the amount of flash memory per phone is
forceast to increase to 64Mb. Figure 2 illustrates this.  
In the early 1990s, the flash makers produced a new product
format, called a flash card : credit card-sized devices on
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      A SRAM is a memory chip that requires power to hold its1
content w ith access times in the 10 to 30-nanosecond range, while
DRAMs are usually above 30. A SRAM can provide a faster access
speed than a DRAM and consume less power than DRAMs of comparable
density but are generally more complicated and expensive to produce
than DRAMs. SRAMs do not require a periodic electrical impulse to
maintain the information they contain.  
The term "cache" refers to a relatively small, but quickly
access ible memory capacity. The cache is interim storage that is
closer to the speed of the CPU. Computers with cache memory also
have a main memory, which is larger, with slower accessibility.
More ad vanced computers function most efficiently when they have
cache m emory in addition to main memory. A memory cache is a block
of high-speed memory that helps match the speed of a fast
microprocessor to a larger block of slower (less-expensive) memory.
They are integrated memory units used to temporarily hold data or
which multiple flash chips were mounted which could be used
like a disk drive for mass storage.
 
With respect to the appropriability of technology, the  basic
technique of production qua design cannot be kept secret,
while the details  of production, i.e. gaining experience, are
highly appropriable. As a consequence the entry barriers with
respect to design technology decrease with the diffusion of
design technology through cross-licensing and personal
mobility, while those for process technology increase in
course of time when semiconductors achieve the high-volume
status. Figure 3 illustrates the development of these entry
barriers in course of time. 
The demand for semiconductors is a function of the demand for
the products in which they are used. Thus, it is a derived
demand and it is not greatly affected by changes in chip
prices. Measured in bits, demand has grown in a more or less
continuous fashion while supply increases occur in large and
discrete increments as producers bring new fabrication
facilities (fabs) into production. Because a new fab can
require up to two years and over $1 billion in capital to
construct, producers must rely on forecasts of demand when
deciding whether to increase capacity. Where forecasts prove
inaccurate, significant undersupply or oversupply can result.
E.g., in early 1995, the demand for SRAMs (Static RAMs) was
expected to increase sharply in the near future. It was widely
forecast that approximately 80% of new PCs using Intel's
Pentium microprocessors would be sold with a SRAM cache
memory . SRAM producers therefore invested in new fabs to meet1
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instr uctions that are likely to be needed for operations by the
microprocessor.
the expected demand. Meanwhile, purchasers built up
inventories in anticipation of a shortage, and drove SRAM
prices sharply higher. By mid-1996, however, it became
apparent that only about 20% of new PCs with Pentium
microprocessors contained a SRAM cache memory. As new fabs
came online and purchasers drew down or sold off large
inventories, SRAM supply expanded and prices fell
significantly.
Chip manufacturers make most of their money from just one
industry, computers, and chip sales are driven by the demand
for computer applications. The second largest outlet for
semiconductors is consumer electronics. The other markets for
semiconductors are communications, the automative market and
the defense market. In 1999 world sales of semiconductor
devices amounted to $145 billion.
PC production accounts for roughly 55% of all the DRAM demand.
Together with workstation and server, that percentage reached
higher than 90% in 1999.
The DRAM demand is observed to grow in an echo to the release
of a major PC application software. In 1988, it had a record-
breaking 85% growth when DOS became the mainstream operating
system (OS). The demand grew dramatically again in 1991 and
1996, when Windows 3.1 and Windows 95 were released and became
popular respectively. On average, each new generation of OS
pushes the DRAM demand higher to about four times of that of
the previous OS. E.g., DOS requires 1Mb; Windows 3.1., 4Mb;
Windows 95, 16 Mb. It is expected that Windows 98, to be
widely installed in 1999, requires 64Mb and pushes the demand
to another height.
The personal computer will shortly be eclipsed as the pre-
eminent consumer of semiconductors, with communications and a
new consumer platform taking center stage. The last few years
have already seen a dramatic shift, with communications
doubling its share of the chip market since 1995 to 22
percent, while PCs have dipped from over 30 percent to around
25 percent today. The communications market is fundamentally
different from the computing market with diverse technologies
and fragmented competition. Communications chip suppliers are
more likely to use outside foundries than PC chip vendors.
Moreover, since many communications circuits are built with
analog or mixed-signal processes, they tend to use older
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process technology. There are some products which are still
driven by 0.7- and 0.8-micron. This will present a challenge
to chip manufacturers, since they need to adopt a broad range
of processes. The emergence of a market for lagging-edge
equipment can even be seen. A lot of g-line steppers are still
being shipped. However, this trend will not slow down the
adoption of new process technology because a number of
communications circuits such as network processors, need to
stay on the leading edge. 
The North American market is highly dependent on the computer
industry. The Japanese semiconductor market relies heavily on
the consumer electronics industry. In Europe, communication
systems are of relatively high importance.
A critical factor in the manufacture of leading-edge circuits
is the timely availability of the best process equipment . The
Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment (SME) industry emerged
in the 1970s and was at first US dominated. However, parallel
to the declining competitiveness in chips have been concerns
about the health of the US semiconductor manufacturing
equipment industry, which saw its world market share decline
from 75% in 1980 to 50% in 1992, while the Japanese share rose
from 18% in 1980 to 43% in 1992. Today the worldwide equipment
business is about $25 billion annually.   
 
The chip market is highly unstable, partly because of massive
fixed costs and partly because the demand for chips can change
rapidly, while a new fabrication plant can take a year or more
to build. Such long lead times mean that the supply of chips
tends to be sticky, that is, it does not adjust smoothly to
price changes or to changes in demand. 
Competition is driven by the speed of new product introduction
with the result that product life cycles  become shorter and
shorter: on average, a new product generation is introduced
every three to six months. 
This leads to a rapid depreciation of plants and equipment and
of R&D. The semiconductor industry has fallen prey to a
"scissors effect" between rapidly increasing fixed capital
costs and the requirement of an accelerated depreciation of
its assets. 
The result is that speed-to-market is of critical importance -
a firm must be able to ramp up production quickly to
competitive yields and quality. According to a McKinsey
general industry study, if a company is late to market with a
new product by only six months, 33 percent of the gross profit
potential is lost over the product life cycle. Improving time-
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to-market by one month improves profits by 11.9 percent. Time-
to-market is particularly critical in high-tech markets that
have been characterized as tornadoes. This dilemma of time-to-
market versus better fabrication technology is the critical
path challenge facing the semiconductor industry today.
The consequence is a built-in tendency for an overshooting of
investment relative to demand growth. The mismatches between
demand and supply occur periodically and lead to price wars.
To recoup its investment, a chip firm will want to run the
plant as near to full capacity as possible. It will not cut
production even when demand drops, producing a glut and even
lower prices. Therefore, in general prices do the adjustment
to shocks, while output expands continuously. E.g., in the
automobile sector quite the opposite applies.
Inherently the semiconductor industry is confronted with boom-
bust cycles . The IC industry seems to be reinventing a
historical six-year cycle of three or so up years and three or
so down years. The cycle goes from strong capital spending to
significant added capacity to declining average selling prices
(ASPs) to reduced capital spending to little added capacity to
increasing ASPs and then the cycle repeats itself. Figure 4
illustrates the industry cycle.
 
The cyclicality does not originate from consumer demand, which
has been growing consistently for the last 20 years,
increasing according to Moore's Law. The problem is that the
industry goes from undersupply to oversupply and back again. A
good forecast system, not of demand but of supply could
moderate this cyclicality. 
Historically, the IC producers' approach to the IC market
place has been very consistent and can be summed up in one
word: overreaction . This overreaction in good and bad times is
what caused the famous boom-bust cycles in the IC industry.
E.g. In 1992, the fourth year of the 1989-1992 downturn, IC
producers invested only by 6 percent and this caused in part
the boom years of 1993-1995. In 1996, the first year of the
1996-1998 downturn, IC producers increased MOS capacity by a
record 5.9 million 200 mm wafer equivalents and this caused IC
pricing to decline for three years in a row from 1996 through
1998. The 1 percent increase in MOS wafer capacity for 1999
was a record low, being less than 10 percent of that in 1996.
While die shrinks and better process control are delivering
more good dice per wafer, a significant capacity shortage is a
strong possibility over the next 18 months. Even a year 2000
surge in IC capital spending will not be able to add
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significant wafer processing capacity until mid-2001 at the
earliest. Figure 5 illustrates the wafer growth slowing since
1992.
One of the explanations of the boom-bust cycles relates to the
existence of double bookings.  Double booking occurs when
buyers who have been put on allocation place orders with their
suppliers that exceed their real needs, just in order to
assure timely delivery of the products they know for sure they
do need. Clients are scared of not being able to secure enough
products and are willing to order 20 to 50 percent more than
they need. The logic behind double booking seems to be based
on the notion that humans extrapolate to form projections
about their future needs. The players include the OEMs that
manufacture the equipment and the IC vendors and they are
impacting each other, horizontally and vertically, with their
own forecasts. 
The main problem is that the forecasts are biased because
humans are poor anticipators of changes in direction; they
extrapolate the most recent trend into the future, ignoring
most previous oscillations. Extrapolation of the present into
the future assures that the projections will miss the key
turning point and that the industry continues full speed ahead
without cylces. Often unnoticed is a mild reduction in demand
which causes a buildup of inventory in the channels. Only
after facing cancellations of larger orders coupled with
returns in significant quantities OEMs realise that the party
is over. As ususal, the process continues down the supply
chain ending with an industry recession. As soon as a slowdown
begins, prices drop, demands (in units) declines, inventories
explode and capacity is underutilized. 
This forecasting-via-extrapolation concept prevents management
from realizing changes in demand until it is too late.
Historically, it seems to take IC management 4 to 6 months to
accept that a peak has occurred and during this period most
decisions are already made in the wrong direction. 
The semiconductor industry seems to be among the few
manufacturing industries that allow the practice of "selling
insurance" i.e. allowing double bookings while not charging
any premiums for this insurance, i.e. penalties for
cancellations. Buyers can place orders for huge quantities of
chips or capital equipment, knowing that canceling part or all
will not trigger a penalty. 
If penalties for cancellations would be enforced, clients will
not place new orders for ten years is the common reaction to
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change the status quo.  
Nevertheless, if suppliers are to charge penalties for
cancellations in their purchase agreements, a significant
improvement in the negative impact of double bookings may be
expected in the future. 
The cycle time consumed from the start of silicon processing
to the end of the assembly-and-test process is between three
to six months. This cycle time imposes severe cash flow
problems because of large work-in-process costs. In addition,
such cycle times mean that production planning must be based
on demand forecast, not actual orders. 
Adding production capacity by building a new fab takes about
two years from initial conception and must run full flow for
up to 10 years to pay for itself. In a market where visibility
is that short and adding capacity takes that long, going
through cycles of overcapacity is inevitable, no matter how
much demand grows. 
Historically the cycles have been very predictable. When
possible, it makes the most sense to build a new fab during
the bust, so it is ready for full-blown production right when
the market is starting a boom period. Unfortunately, this
would require spending hundreds of millions of dollars at a
time when the market is down.
Normally it is considered prudent to wait for the market to be
up for a number of months before committing to an expensive
new fab project. However, this limits the time that the new
fab can be used to take advantage of that up market. The
advantage to starting a new fab project when the market is
down, is only available to firms that can afford to do so.
One of the safety valves to protect against undercapacity for
the companies that wait are the foundries which become second-
source fabs either for traditional semiconductor companies or
dedicated to particular customers. Foundries should be taken
into account when evaluating overcapacity.
The tendency in the market is to overreact in both phases of
the cycle. Companies tend to add too much capacity in the boom
periods and cut back too much capacity in the bust periods.
This deepens the boom-bust cycle. Most of the reason for a
downturn in the semiconductor industry is overcapacity.
Overcapacity has driven DRAM prices downward, even though
demand for memory has continued to grow at nearly 75% per
year. 
The semiconductor industry is characterized by high fixed-
costs and patent races. To remain competitive firms must
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continuously invest a significant share of revenues in R&D and
new plant and equipment. In the USA it is common to allocate
more than 30% of sales and  revenue to R&D and capital
expenditures. R&D expenditures as a percent of sales were
fairly constant (12-14% between 1990 and 1994) for US merchant
manufacturers, while capital expenditures have risen to
unprecedented levels; in 1994 capital expenditures amounted to
17% to total sales after ranging between 10-12% in the
previous four years. The ratio of capital expenditures is the
highest among the industries for which data are available and
exceeds the next highest industries (5% for steel and
pharmaceuticals) by a factor of 3.4. The semiconductor R&D
ratio is exceeded only by pharmaceuticals and matched by
software, what is unsurprising since these industries are
characterized by patents and intellectual property rights,
which provide incentives for investment in R&D.
Financial performance in the semiconductor industry tends to
be highly cyclical. Since 1978 there have been four
expansionary cycles in which worldwide revenues grew at rates
in excess of 25% per year. Each of these boom periods was 4 to
6 years in length. In periods of troughs sales revenues either
declined or stagnated.
Profits as a percent of sales have been strong during boom
periods; in each of the past three expansionary periods, the
pre-tax income has averaged about 10% of sales revenues. In
1993 and 1994, financial performance was outstanding with 20%
pre-tax income of sales. In 1994 the profit margin for
semiconductors is exceeded only by that of pharmaceuticals and
some financial institutions.  
Recently a consistently large difference has been identified
between the 21-year average worldwide semiconductor industry
growth rate (17%) and the actual individual yearly figures. As
shown in figure 6, each year from 1978 through 1998 the
worldwide semiconductor industry either grew 24 percent or
more, or 10 percent or less. Never in this 21-year period did
the worldwide semiconductor industry grow between 10-24
percent (± points from the average). It is ironic that 1999,
the year immediately after this long-term trend was revealed,
registered the first exception to the trend in more than 20
years. In 2000, the worldwide semiconductor industry is
forecast to increase 23 percent. If this occurs, industry
growth will be more in line with the historical trends.
However, the market rarely behaves exactly as expected.
At present semiconductor equipment suppliers must speed up the
delivery time and ramp-to-performance of their gear to satisfy
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the shorter design cycles of their chip customers. The
technology cycles have shrunk over the last 10 years from
three and half years to two years and sometimes even less than
two years rendering older chips obsolete. Chip makers need
their equipment vendors to respond more quickly. Normally one
sees stretching out and then shrinking in, but lead times
never get on average less than six to nine months, what is too
long compared to the life cycles of the technology. By the
time the equipment is installed and running, a full year can
pass before wafers start coming out of the end of the pipe.
In this repect a variable that comes into play is the specter
of 300 mm technology. Building one of the first 300 mm fabs
may be too risky and building one of the last 200 mm fabs may
be committing to a facility that will become too obsolete to
pay for itself. It is very possible that many companies will
postpone adding to their own capacity and this may lead to an
undercapacity situation, raise IC prices and set up the next
boom period. Unfortunately, these companies then build enough
new fabs just in time to set up the next overcapacity
condition.
A key problem burdening the industry's equipment
supplier/device manufacturer interdependence is the continuous
shifting of responsibility for technical advances taking place
to key equipment suppliers. In past wafer size transitions,
chip producers shared risk and development costs with
equipment manufacturers, along with development of key
technologies at Bell Labs, NTT and IBM's research labs.
However, in the 200 to 300 mm transition, being not simply a
scaling effort but involving fundamental technology shifts,
semiconductor manufacturers dedicate R&D dollars almost
exclusively to IC design, process integration, yield
enhancement, etc, leaving the bulk of the 300 mm R&D burden to
wafer fab equipment suppliers. From 1993 to 1997 equipment
industry R&D spending has surged by 30% per year and could
reach $3.6 billion per by 2000 and $4.3 billion by 2001. 
A promising new technology may be to manufacture spherical
silicon semiconductors replacing traditional rectangular
chips, allowing the entire surface of the sphere to be used
for circuity unlike flat wafer processing where some parts are
wasted. The advantage is that there is no need to build
traditional and costly cleanrooms. Moreover it offers the
potential of equipment and process stability across several
generations of technology so that the enormous capital
infusions every few years for new processes and equipments to
accomodate more complex systems and larger wafer sizes may be
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avoided. The first commercially viable product will probably
be manufactured in 2000.
On january 19, 2000, Transmeta, a notoriously secretive firm
based in Santa Clara, California, unveiled a new kind of
microchip. The immediate benefit is a microprocessor that can
run software written for Intel's chips, while consuming a
fraction of the power. It is considered to be the first truly
innovative development in processors in the last 12 years.
Although microprocessors have continued to improve in
performance over the past few years, there was a price to be
paid: millions of transistors were needed to pull these tricks
off, so that the modern x86 chips were large and power-hungry,
which was bad news of users of portable computers.
Transmeta's chips operate in a fundamentally new way, allowing
them to emulate any existing microprocessor without the loss
of performance normally associated with such emulation. The
new chip is specifically designed to execute micro-operations
quickly and efficiently: it maximizes battery life while
optimizing performance. In technical terms, a special layer of
"code-morphing" software that sits between the chip and the
x86 program fools the program into thinking that it is running
on a standard x86-compatible processor. 
The advantage is that far more complex kinds of optimisation
are possible. By translating a particular chunk of x86 code
into micro-ops it can store the translated chunk in a special
memory to avoid having to translate it again as has to be done
by using hardware. The immediate benefit of all this trickery
is to reduce power consumption. People are tired of their
batteries running out, tired of shoulder burn from heavy
laptops. Transmeta's Crusoe TM5400 chip, which is intended for
use in laptop computers, has a performance comparable with a
mobile Pentium III, but contains a quarter of the number of
logic transistors and consumes a twentieth of the power. In
effect, the Crusoe is a silicon chameleon, allowing one
computer to run not only Windows but also Macintosh programs
and Sony PlayStation games. Transmeta chips can be upgraded
with software to remain on the cutting edge for years with
simple keystrokes so that no longer road warriors have to keep
buying new laptops to get the latest gee-whiz features. 
Transmeta has so far declined to take on Intel on its home
ground, but ultra-light laptops are the fastest-growing part
of the PC market and that is a nice niche market for the
Transmeta chip in the coming post-desktop era. The first
version of the Crusoe processor is targeted at mobile Internet
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devices operating with the Mobile Linux OS and will be
available in the first half of 2000.  
Its radical approach looks likely to have a profound influence
on the future course of the industry.
 
2. Structure of the Industry.
A widely used classification of the semiconductor industry
differentiates between firms manufacturing standard products
sold to many different users and customer-specific devices
manufactured for one end-user only.
Until just a few years ago, US and European firms deemphasized
commodity products on which competition from Japan and South
Korea was strong, in favour of high-integration, design-
intensive products.
Another basic distinction in the semiconductor industry is
between captive and merchant firms. Captive firms (IBM), are
vertically integrated and consume the chips they produce,
having little influence on prices. As purchasers on the market
they desire low prices.
Merchants firms (Motorola) produce for sale. They reap gains
from maintaining high prices and they benefit from protection. 
The US industry is largely composed of merchants, while
Japanese producers are largely vertically integrated in
"keiretsu". 
Nowadays the chip industry is shifting from a vertically
integrated single-nation based industry to a horizontally
integrated, cooperative industry based on multinational
partnerships and alliances. 
Over time firms have progressively integrated their erstwhile
standalone operations in individual host countries into
increasingly complex international production networks: they
have broken down the value chain into discrete functions and
located them wherever they could be carried out most
effectively and where they were needed to facilitate the
penetration of important growth markets. Reduction of costs
was one important motivation. Of equal importance was access
to clusters of specialized capabilities and contested growth
markets and the need to speed up response time to
technological change and to changing market requirements. The
result is that an increasing share of the value-added shifts
across the boundaries of the firms as well as across national
borders. 
Not long ago, some contract manufacturers did little more than
plain-vanilla assembly. But now, in addition to manufacturing,
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these electronics-manufacturing services (EMS) companies can
provide design, distribution, even customer services.
Outsourcing is not really contract manufacturing anymore. That
was the old model. It is EMS. It is a very broad range of
services: everything from designing the chips to the product
to the supply chain to the manufacturing to the testing to the
aftermarket support and repair. A company outsources just
about everything it can, from foundry work through assembly to
inventory management and even testing. A company might get its
products designed by one enterprise, its silicon provided by
another, the assembly handled by a third, integration and
packaging by a fourth and so on. The host or brand company
basically is responsible for some R&D, marketing and demand
generation. 
There is seemingly no end to the degree to which name-brand
electronics manufacturers want to outsource to reduce costs.
Offloading all or part of manufacturing has freed the brand-
name equipment makers to focus on research and development,
marketing and sales and has led to huge growth among the
contract manufacturers. It is all about R&D and marketing
these days, someone else has to handle all the rest.  
E.g., IBM is outsourcing but keeps the supply chain in terms
of supply and technology in its own hands. IBMs manufacturing
campus employs more than 7000 workers, but fewer than 1500 are
actual IBM employers. That's because IBM uses a number of
other companies to perform certain manufacturing tasks, such
as cable assembly, enclosures, and subassemblies.
 
The supply chains have changed more in the past three years
than in the prior 30. The industry has gone from monogamous
relationships to a swinging sixties multiple partners model.
Wall Street loves it. The talk today is of leveraged supply
chains. 
This trend of outsourcing both within the nation and across
countries is manifest in different directions:
* Upstream wafer fabrication ("front-end") is increasingly
performed by foundries for another microchip supplier.
* Downstream, "back-end" assembly and test operations can also
be outsourced.
* A new type of advanced chip supplier is the design-focused
fabless house which does not produce wafers. Design-ins refer
to the practice of designing semiconductor devices for
specific commercial products. 
Currently, companies are outsourcing the equivalent of just
10% to 15% of the total cost of all electronics goods sold and
in the next few years this figure could rise to 50% and even
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75%.
At present the foundry industry is experiencing a boom that
will continue well into the present decade. With the
convergence of the technology roadmap at the 0.25 micron level
in 1998 the foundry business suddenly and fundamentally
changed. With that convergence the foundries became providers
of industry-leading technology so that every start-up has
access to cutting-edge silicon performance and density. This
had been leveled the playing field for the industry. 
But there is more to a game than just a level playing field.
Designers who want to play the leading-edge game find
themselves increasingly in need of leading-edge help, in the
form of design, packaging and test services. Not every foundry
can answer that call. But the leading foundries with the
ability to leverage the latest products and best practices of
the leading equipment and materials manufacturers have moved
well ahead of the rest. These foundries have seen that the
name of the game is not just about processes and technology,
but also about integrating world-class intellectual property
and tools into their business flows. These foundries have
built relationships with electronic design automation houses,
library vendors, IP developers and back-end packaging and test
houses to help them deliver the services designers need. 
Today, the state-of-the-art foundries grant designers the
freedom to choose the best new place-and-route engine or
functional block or library. Even before the emerging
standardized processes become commercially available,
designers have access to a wide array of best-of-class
services. Therefore, the ability to deliver leading-edge
technology and to leverage the latest services has opened the
door of system-on-chip design to the global community. 
By 2010, foundries are expected to produce more than 45
percent of all wafers and will support 40-50 percent of total
semiconductor industry revenue.
This foundry growth is driven by four factors.
1) The explosive growth of the wireless and broadband
communications infrastructure requires increasing complex ICs.
Therefore, device manufacturers are investing more money in
their core competencies (design and IP) and are outsourcing
manufacturing to the foundries.
2) These emerging applications are enabled by ICs that exploit
the latest process technologies and foundries can supply this
technology cost-effectively, creating economies of scale by
pooling the demand of hundreds of customers. In the past
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foundries were as much as two or three generations behind the
leading device manufacturers but now they have closed that
gap.
3) The cost of building new fabs is becoming increasingly
prohibitive for all but a very few companies. A 300mm fab will
soon cost $2.5 billion. The foundry business model, by pooling
demand, will allow these mega-factories to ramp to profitable
volume at an accelerated rate.
4) Foundries offer increasingly competitive customer service
through value-added design, testing etc., which were
previously only found at the internal facilities of an
integrated device manufacturer.
These factors explain why the demand for pure-play foundry
services is skyrocketing. They are capable to satisfy the
customer requirements of demand fulfillment, fast turnaround,
leading-edge process technology, high and stable yields and a
strong service record. 
In this respect a cluster model has gained importance where
fabs are constructed next to each other to take advantage of
economies of scale and of engineering knowledge such as in
Hsinchu (Taiwan), Singapore and the state of Washington.
Taiwan's foundry industry has been the world's leader since
1995 and many overseas as well as domestic device
manufacturers are eagerly participating in foundry business.
Measured by cost of goods sold, probably 10 cents out of every
dollar in the manufacturing of electronics products involves
contract manufacturers. The silicon foundry business is
expected to grow from $7 billion in revenues to $36 billion in
2004 as more integrated device manufacturers opt to outsource
chip production. This growth will reshape the future of
semiconductor manufacturing and strategic outsourcing will
become a long-term solution to the cost penalties of in-house
fabrication. 
Currently, foundries produce about 12% of the semiconductors
in the world, and by 2004 that share will more than double to
26%. The Big Three pure-play foundries (Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing, United Microelectronics Corp. and Chartered
Semiconductor Manufacturing) collectively account for 69% of
today's silicon foundry volume, but their share is expected to
grow to 88% by 2004.
Behind the move of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
seeking to offload their production woes (e.g. in terms of
inventory management) lies something of a financial paradox .
Wall Street apparently has become wary of manufacturing
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concerns, fearful that they cannot achieve an adequate return
on their capital. Therefore, to remain cost competitive
companies are being forced to outsource driven by Wall Street.
Yet investors do not seem concerned when those same assets
turn up on contract manufacturers' balance sheets, as is
witnessed by the contrasting stock market performance of OEMs
and subcontractors.
The move toward the fabless model by outsourcing to foundries,
which will result in fewer integrated device manufacturers,
may help a lot to mitigate the cyclicality of the
semiconductor industry. The remaining integrated device
manufacturers will have more scale, more capability to do
incremental fab additions, more structure and large markets to
serve. They will know more about what is going on in the
markets they serve and have the necessary critical mass to
grow in a more controlled manner. 
To take an example, let's say there is demand for more devices
and there are, say, eight relatively small companies which all
build a fab. Since they are not large companies, they don't
know whether they can fill the fab and may make a billion-
dollar mistake. However, a major foundry might be able to meet
the needs of those eight fab companies by building only three
new fabs instead of eight fabs. This more moderate fab growth
could reduce the oversupply problem. Therefore, as companies
continue going fabless the industry might become less
cyclical. 
 
To date foundry companies can be classified into two groups:
the dedicated foundry companies mostly located in the Asia-
Pacific region and the integrated device manufacturers with a
foundry business line which are mainly American or Japanese
companies. Figure 7 shows the global foundry players.
However, scattering production around the globe has its
drawbacks. A question for OEM strategists is often whether
shipping costs offset the cheapness of labor overseas,
particularly Asia. For some, the promised savings vanish when
they have to employ batteries of phone clerks in the OEM
headquarters to track orders lost or stuck somewhere along the
global supply chain. Therefore, the emerging strategy is for
firms to place much of the manufacturing close to their end
markets. Increasingly, the fabrication and cutting of wafers
along with the assembling and testing of finished goods all
occurs within a particular region, depending on the end
market. By adopting a regional approach, OEMs can cut both
their time to market and their inventories.
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There are a few constraints to the growth of outsourcing.
1) Execution is not the least of them. Sustaining high growth
rates is famously difficult. In the race to become the
biggest, most global, most diverse electronics-manufacturing
provider, a company could spread itself too thin and fail to
provide enough customer attention and responsiveness, so that
clients will jump to smaller companies.
2) Not every OEM has wholeheartedly embraced the outsourcing
model. Some companies worry about becoming overly reliant on
outsiders. Overdependence on a contract manufacturer can be a
problem. Confidentiality is a problem too.
3) Choosing a contract manufacturer can be a perilous
decision. Contract manufacturers cannot always meet the
demands of their clients. Every time they pick a provider,
they bet their business, because if they pick the wrong
provider and if they cannot get their product to market at the
right quality, at the right time, they don't have a business.
Risks aside, the movement toward outsourcing is gathering
strength. If electronics production shifts to the contract
manufacturers as expected, their clients may one day wake up
to find that the servants have become richer than their
masters.
The conclusion may be that foundries have an ever-growing
presence, with leading-edge technologies and an increasing
demand for their services. OEMs dream of finding a contractor
with sufficient versatility and skill to take a design,
produce the early samples, build up volume, distribute into
key markets and then ensure that the OEM does not get billed
for piles of obsolete inventory. 
However, contract manufacturers operate on razor-thin margins,
often as little as 3.5% of sales. As some point out, contract
manufacturers could face problems similar to those that drove
the OEMs out of manufacturing in the first place. As the
cliché goes: The more things change, the more they stay the
same. 
2.1. The Role of Original Equipment Manufacturing.
Original Equipment Manufacturing (OEM) has played an important
role in the development of East Asian latecomers in the
semiconductor industry.
OEM is a specific form of subcontracting, under which a
latecomer supplier produces a finished product to the precise
specification of a foreign TNC. The foreign firm then markets
the product under its own brand name using its own
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distribution channels, enabling the latecomer to circumvent
the need for investing in marketing and distribution. OEM
evolved out of the joint operations of buyers and latecomer
suppliers and became the most important channel for export
marketing in East Asia during the 1980s. OEM often involves
the foreign partner in the selection of capital equipment and
the training of managers, engineers and technicians as well as
advice on production, financing and management. In South
Korea, OEM is sometimes linked to licensing deals. Successful
OEM arrangements often involve a close long-term technological
relationship between partner companies, because the TNC
depends on the quality, delivery and price of the final
output. The outsourcing of (part of) the production process to
another company has been the prime transaction, rather than
the possible knowledge transfer.
The term OEM originated in the 1950s among computer makers who
used subcontractors (called the OEM) to assemble equipment for
them. Under early forms of OEM, the latecomer performed only
value-added related to assembly services. In the 1960s it was
adopted by US chip companies who used OEMs to assemble and
test semiconductors for them. Since then the term has acquired
a variety of meanings. 
In 1988 and 1989 this system began to be called Own Design and
Manufacture (ODM) in Taiwan. Under the ODM the latecomer
carries out some or all of the product design and process
tasks needed to produce a good according to a general design
layout supplied by the foreign buyer or TNC, while still
avoiding the risk of launching own-brand products and the
costs of investing in foreign marketing and distribution
channels. ODM indicates an advance in technological competence
relative to OEM, although it applied mainly to incremental
(follower) design, rather than leadership product innovations
based on R&D.
The OEM/ODM system has several disadvantages. Strategically,
the latecomer is often subordinated to the decisions of the
foreign company and dependent on it for technological and
components as well as market channels. The TNC will often
impose restrictions on the sales activities of latecomer
suppliers. Without their own distribution outlets, the post-
manufacturing value-added is limited. Moveover, OEM and ODM
make it difficult for local companies to build up the
international brand images needed for high quality goods.
Despite the problems inherent with OEM/ODM, it would be wrong
to understate the importance of the system. It facilitated
rapid industrial growth in electronics and permitted the
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assimilation of technology. In some cases the more restrictive
clauses on OEM and licensing could be renegotiated. E.g.,
marketing restrictions on mature products have often been set
aside so that South Korean firms could sell directly into
third countries. The system allowed many companies to achieve
economies of scale in production and, in some cases, justified
investments in automation technology. For their part, foreign
TNCs continued to benefit from low-cost capacity expansion,
enabling rival TNCs to compete with each other. OEM/ODM
therefore endured a mutually valued arrangement.
Sometimes there was progression from OEM to ODM to OBM (Own-
Brand Manufacture). OBM occurs where the firm sells goods
under its own brand name, capturing more of the post-
production added value. Then capabilities are learned with
respect to technology, organization, management and  marketing. 
In course of time the importance of OEM contracts as a source
of technological upgrading has decreased because many firms
have by now accumulated substantial knowledge about product
design, quality control systems as well as managerial
practices. E.g., for Samsung the disadvantages outweigh the
benefits gained from OEM business, so that it minimizes the
importance of OEM contracts. Daewoo Electronics is known to be
heavily dependent on OEM sales.
It may be concluded that OEM contracts have served as an
important source to upgrade the technological capabilities of
the Korean and Taiwanese firms. OEM also played a crucial role
in the development of the electronics industry in Singapore
and Hong Kong. 
2.2. Licensing and Cross-Licensing.
Patents and trade secrets have become a key element of
competition in high tech industries. In general, fierce
competition has put a premium on innovation and on defending
intellectual property (IP) from unlicensed imitators.
In the semiconductor industry licensing and cross-licensing of
IP has become a significant dimension of competition. It
involves the sale or exchange of property rights and gives
companies reciprocal access to the technology of other
companies without risking patent interference.
Because the range of technology is too great for a single firm
to develop its entire needs internally, a firm competing with
advanced products and processes is likely to utilize not only
its own technologies, but also the patents of others. Firms
will need to cross-license patents from others to ensure that
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they have freedom to manufacture without being sued for
infringement. 
Developing a valuable patent portfolio is increasingly
important because patents provide not only protection from
imitation, but they provide bargaining chips in negotiating
access to other firm's technology and they may be an
additional source of earnings. The value of a portfolio is
greatest when it has a high proportion of high-quality patents
that cover significant product markets. Most likely the firm
is to create valuable IP where it is actively involved in the
market, i.e. in its core business. In developing its patent
portfolio the firm should not focus on those technological
areas where its cross-licensee is strongest in an attempt to
duplicate or avoid the licensee's patents. 
An important dimension of cross-licensing is the calculation
of balancing royalty payments according to the relative value
of the patent portfolios of each party. Each firm's IP
contribution is evaluated by estimating the value of a firm's
patent portfolio to its licensing partner, with the net
royalty payments to the one with the greater contribution.
Therefore, the key to successful cross-licensing is a
portfolio of quality patents that covers large areas of the
partner's product markets. The increasing importance of IP has
spurred intelllectual capital management from the mere
licensing of residual technology of the past to a central
element in technology strategy. At present new entrants and
incumbents are not only protecting their IP but are
increasingly exploiting it.
2.3. Patent Paradox.
In the USA in 1984 the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
(SCPA) established protection from copying the design of
semiconductor manufacturing. This Act aimed at improving the
ability of semiconductor firms to prevent unauthorized copying
and use of their semiconductor layout designs, e.g. by making
it more difficult to challenge a patent's validity and by
increasing the penalties on infringers through awarding higher
damage in patent disputes.
Its economic significance appears to be limited since only one
case has ever been litigated under its provisions. This may be
due to the increasing complexity of manufacturing process
technologies. Copying of a design device is necessary but not
sufficient to enable large-scale production of infringing
products. 
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In the fabless segment of the industry in which contracts with
other firms are required because of the extensive reuse of
design data the SCPA has facilitated the licensing process. 
Despite the legal strengthening of the enforceability of US
patent rights, evidence suggests that US manufacturing firms
rely more heavily on secrecy and lead time to recoup their R&D
investments than they do on legal mechanisms such as patents. 
Since the early 1980s the effectiviness of patents as a means
of appropriating R&D returns has declined. However, this
decline has coincided with a recent and unprecedented surge in
the overall number of US patents applied for and granted to
firms each year. The propensity of semiconductor firms to
patent has risen dramatically. Around 1986 a rather steep rise
occurred in the patent applications obtained per million
dollars of real R&D spending in the semiconductor industry.
Patenting per million 1992 real R&D dollars in the
semiconductor industry doubled between 1982 and 1992 from
about 0.3 to 0.6. In the semiconductor industry this gap
between the relative ineffectiveness of patents and their
widespread use is particularly striking.  
The question is why are semiconductor firms patenting so
aggressively while they do not rely heavily on patents to
recoup their R&D investments?
Patents still perform their traditional function of
safeguarding against outright theft and infringement and
imitation of inventions. However, this classical role of
patents seems to be dominated by a broader use of patents as
"legal bargaining chips". This enables firms to avoid being
excluded in a particular field of use, to obtain more
favorable terms of their licensing agreements with other
patent owners, to gain access to external technologies on more
favorable terms of trade and to safeguard against costly
patent litigation.
Since a single firm rarely owns all the rights to technologies
embodied in a new product it is important to have assets with
which to trade in the event that other patent owners assert
their rights against the firm.
Because of the short product life cycles in this industry and
the fact that competitive advantage is largely driven by lead
time, design complexity and superior manufacturing
capabilities, patents are a relatively ineffective means by
which to profit from inventions, at least for current-
generation products. In the US it takes 18 months on average
for a patent to issue, while the average life cycle of
semiconductor products ranges from a year to 16 months.
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Successor generations of products may incorporate the older
technology embodied in the patent, but even this period might
last 4-6 years, which is far less than the 20 year life of the
patent. Nevertheless, the longer-term value of patents can
remain quite high if future generations of products build on
the widely used patented technology and alternative methods
are difficult or prohibitively costly to adopt. 
Therefore, manufacturers are clearly ramping up their patent
portfolios and harvesting their latent inventions to add to
their stock of issued patents. There appears to be a "race to
patent" not to win rights to some standalone technological
prize, but a race to create patents as bargaining chips in
negotiations with other patent owners to secure the right to
exclude others before being excluded themselves.
3. Cost - Price Relationship and Marketing Strategies.     
In the electronics industry products seldom wear out before
becoming obsolete. The economic consequences of approaching
technical barriers will be felt before the technological
barriers are reached. E.g., the costs of achieving higher
levels of chip performance rise very rapidly as the limits of
a manufacturing technology are approached and then surpassed.
Figure 8 illustrates this point. Technology barriers, T  and 1
T , are where minute increases in chip performance can be2
achieved only at a huge cost. Economic barriers occur where
increasing costs drive prices beyond the maximum price buyers
are willing to pay, (at E  and E ), causing the market to1 2
stagnate before the technological barriers are encountered.
Eventually, as a new manufacturing technology takes hold, the
industry jumps from a cost-performance curve associated with
the old technology to a new curve for the new process. When
this happens, higher levels of performance are obtainable,
shifting the barriers to E  and T . This prompts buyers to2 2
replace older equipment. 
Several sorts of scale economies are prominent in
semiconductor production:
* Static  scale economies: the costs of building a chip
facility and the R&D cost are incurred once before production
begins and are then averaged over all chips produced, so that
the larger the production, the smaller the average costs.
* Dynamic scale economies: they are cumulatively experienced
as long as more chips are produced because failure rates fall.
* Dynamic  scale economies: they extend across generations  of
chips. Producing one type of chip enhances the ability of
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firms to develop and produce future generations of chips. 
All these scale economies are internal  to the individual chip
producer: they depend on what that producer does. 
There are also scale economies external  to the individual chip
producer. Semiconductors are intermediate goods so that the
production process of chips generates valuable knowledge
useful to other chip producers and to developers of products
that use chips. Due to these spillover effects the
semiconductor industry is considered to be a strategic sector,
deserving governmental support. 
In DRAMs there are several published reports of an empirical
72 percent "learning curve", meaning that current unit cost
drops by 28 percent with every doubling of output. Figure 9
demonstrates that in terms of the price per bit there is
indeed a historical 70% price slope. 
Volume manufacturing cost of 256 Mb DRAMs on 200 mm wafers
would be nearly $1600/wafer or a good die cost close of
$15/cm . The average selling price of a 256 Mb DRAM in (early2
2001) is estimated to be $25-$30 based on extrapolation of
current 16 and 64 Mb DRAM price trends, about 10 cents per Mb.
Figure 10 demonstrates this point.
For EPROMs the learning curve is of 79 per cent type, i.e.
doubling output of EPROMs reduces average cost by 21 per cent.
An important characteristic of semiconductors is the strong
and regular price fall, both for the price of a single chip
and for the price per bit (binary information unit). For a
given  technology, the cost per chip is falling over time as a
result of improved yield. After learning, there is no further
scope for cost reduction through improvements in the yield
factor. To decrease cost further the number of chips per wafer
must increase, i.e. a  new  technology with a smaller design
rule must be adopted. 
The price patterns for DRAMs appear to follow the typical life
cycle. At the beginning of the product cycle of a given
generation, the price is very high, but it quickly falls to a
level where it becomes competitive with a previous generation
in terms of per bit price. The unit prices are initially very
high, then decline - rapidly at first and then less rapidly -
to reach a low range (typically after 7 years) and finally
tend to increase until significant shipments end.
This life-cycle pattern also appears to apply to other types
of memory chips. 
Each chip density and subtype has a typical life-cycle pattern
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for prices and quantities. Quantities of shipments of chips of
a specific density begin with small numbers, grow to a peak,
and then decline to insignificant numbers. Unit prices start
at typically high amounts, decline to a low and then increase
as the chip nears the end of its lifespan. The lows for unit
prices may coincide with peak shipment rates, or they may lag
several years. Table 1 illustrates this pattern for 16-kilobit
DRAMs.
The primary determinant of memory chip prices is density. By
and large, the larger capacity, higher density memory chips
will sell for more than lower density chips. 
For selected chip types, the life-cycle price patterns for
different chip densities result, over time, in chips with
increasingly higher densities offering the lowest price per
bit of storage capacity. This pattern starts with 4-kilobit
DRAM chips in 1975 and ends with 16-megabit chips in 1995. In
1995, the cheapest price is less than 0.2 percent of the
cheapest price in 1975. See figures 11 and 12.
 
Historically DRAM prices have followed the "pi-rule": 
for each generation of chips prices tended to decline
asymptotically toward the $3 level (pi = 3.14) as mass
production of that generation peaked and to half that level at
the end of its life.
On the other hand a bi-rule (meaning doubling) is also
observable, suggesting that in the future every new-generation
chip will approximately double in price as mass production
peaks. An example of the bi-rule is the appearance in the mid-
1980s of VRAM technology chips, i.e. special video memory
chips, which led to persistent price premiums for VRAMs. The
prices of VRAM chip have been roughly double the prices of
standard technology DRAM chips of the same density. Figures 13
and 14 illustrate these patterns.
 
The price index for memory chips declined at a 37-percent
average annual rate from 1975 to 1985 and at a 20-percent
average annual rate from 1985 to 1996.
The price index for microprocessors declined at a 35-percent
average annual rate from 1985 to 1996.
In February 2000, ASPs of all semiconductors (integrated and
discrete combined) had fallen to $6.31 after peaking at just
over $9 during November 1999. In April 2000, over the previous
twelve months, average sales prices (ASP) had plunged by 9.4%. 
The average microprocessor sold in February 2000 cost $78.11,
15.3% less than during February 1999 when they peaked at
$92.21 per unit.
33
The memory market is characterized by the frequent
introduction of more advanced versions or generations which
tend to replace existing products. The first producer to
market a superior product often enjoys favorable pricing for a
certain period. As other producers enter the market and
production efficiencies are achieved, however, prices are
driven down and the product in question changes in character
from a high value-added product to a commodity-type product.
Price then becomes a primary factor in purchasing decisions.
In the semiconductor industry firms qua time profile of market
shares follow one of three distinct strategies in respect to
their timing of entry into each new generation of products:
(1) the leader enters early and the market share begins from
unity and falls monotonically;
(2) the follower follows the leader after some lapse of time
and his market share first falls and then rises;
(3) the latecomer enters late with a monotonically rising
share profile.
Intel is known for its a "cream-skimming" rather than forward
pricing strategy, introducing a product early but at high
price and withdrawing it after other firms begin marketing at
lower prices. 
Texas Instruments (TI) is a highly efficient producer and
known for its marketing strategy of undercutting competitors'
prices to capture a greater market share.
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) is known as a second source
producer or imitator which entered late into a given
generation and tried to stay until the end.
Table 2 shows the top ten chip makers in terms of 1999 sales
and tabel 3 mentions the top ten equipment manufacturers.
It is obvious that no company is on the verge of challenging
Intel for the number one ranking. The remainder of the top ten
company rankings is forecast to display some volatility.
 
Industry concentration and its related anti-competitive
implications are mitigated by international competition.
Although the semiconductor industry appears fairly
concentrated in the USA, it is relatively unconcentrated
worldwide. In 1996 the top leading firms in the USA had a
market share of 68%, while the top four companies comprised
approximately 35% of worldwide IC sales. The top eight
comprised about 56% of total sales
In general, the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index
appeared to decline from an initially high level, then to
nearly 0.1 and at the end of the cycle it rises sharply as
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producers drop the product line. The U-shaped time profile
reaches the minimum after about 5 years. Figure 15 shows the
historical pattern of concentration in DRAM supply.
4. Significance of Recessions.
The semiconductor industry seems to go through a recession
every four years: in 1977, 1981, 1985, 1990-1991, 1995-1996.
The last major downturn was in 1996 after which chip makers
raised production capacity too high. It lasted into 1998. The
current boom has started in mid-1999.
 
A typical measure of the business cycle is the book-to-bill
(B/B) ratio. The B/B ratio compares new chip orders to prior
sales. In April 1996 the ratio had dropped to 0.78, its lowest
point since 1985. This meant that for every $100 worth of
chips the industry was making, shipping and billing, it was
only taking orders (bookings) for $78 worth. In April 2000 the
ratio was 1.45.  
The B/B ratio is a three month moving average of seasonally
adjusted bookings and billings computed from the WSTS (World
Semiconductor Trade Statistics) out of a voluntary sample of
70 participating firms, representing at least 40% of sales to
the Americas.
The predicament of the B/B as an indicator of market well-
being is that a monthly value of the B/B may increase versus
the previous month in two opposite situations.
* When orders increase faster than sales, this is a positive
situation indicating that business is growing.
* When orders decrease more slowly than do sales, this may
happen when the market is in a slump.
The same situation applies to a decrease in the B/B ratio,
which may decrease when orders decline faster than sales,
which is interpreted negatively. The B/B ratio also may
decline because the increase in orders does not keep up with
the increase in shipments when the market is booming, e.g. due
to lack of capacity.
Although the B/B has usually portrayed market conditions
accurately, it may mislead its users by announcing a false
change in market direction in very critical times.
Two situations may illustrate this.
* In the third quarter of 1983, the B/B decreased for a couple
of months after almost a year of steady increases. This was a
false alarm, since neither sales nor orders followed it.
* In the first quarter of 1985, the B/B indicated that the
market was improving. Sales data disproved it. The B/B went
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from 0.61 to 0.75 because sales were decreasing faster than
orders. Thus, the ratio of orders to sales improved, while the
market itself was heading down.
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) decided to cease
publishing the IC B/B ratio three years ago, although the
semiconductor equipment industry association continues to do
so. In this sector the B/B cannot serve as market predictors
either. Two almost identical periods of B/B decline had
opposite results. The B/B decline at the beginning of 1995 was
followed by a strong 1995 market. And the B/B decline at the
beginning of 1996 was an overture to the 1996 recession.
Therefore, a steep decline of the B/B does not guarantee a
recession, nor does a steep increase assure that a strong
growth will follow. 
These cases have provided enough evidence to discount the B/B
as an accurate predictor of turning points. Using the B/B to
predict the future is nothing better than guessing. Bookings
deliver better predictive information than the B/B and they
actually call the turning points in shipments.
With each cyclical downturn, semiconductor companies have been
forced to make painful adjustments. US firms reacted by laying
off workers and cutting back on new capital investment. 
In Japan due to lifetime employment practices firms were
precluded from lay-offs of large segments of the workforce.
Deep financial pockets enabled them to invest heavily in new
plant facilities in particular during recessions. The large
vertically integrated structure of Japanese firms utilized the
built-in advantages of cross-subsidization out of profits
earned by the sale of downstream consumer electronics products
which placed them in a better position to deal with
recessions. 
Due to a slump in semiconductor sales in 1974-75, US firms
reduced dramatically their capital investment in new
production facilities. When demand for semiconductors began to
increase in 1977-78, shortages of production capacity rapidly
emerged. Facing lengthy delivery delays, many US customers
turned to Japanese firms as a source of supply. 
The principal lesson for US merchant semiconductor producers
was the need to avoid a shortage of fabrication capacity after
a recession. Therefore, by investing in new production
capacity during the recession US firms expected to recapture
in 64K and 256K DRAMs the market share they had lost in 16K
devices. The same lesson has been learned e.g. by Samsung,
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which despite Korea's crisis continued to invest through the
downturn and thus enjoyed fat profits in 1999 when the market
surged again. 
5. Global Competition.
The DRAM market has become the battlefield for the product
development of commodity chips. This market has seen a
dramatic change in its structure starting at the end of the
1970s. Figure 16 illustrates the reversal in competitiveness
between the dominant global players since 1980. Next table
shows how for the different DRAM devices the maximum market
shares have developed between the USA and Japan.    
Device type Volume      USA     Japan
production
1K     1971       95       5 
4K     1974       83      17
16K     1977       59      41
64K     1979       29      71
256K     1982        8      92
1M     1985        4      96
4M     1990        2      98
16M     1997       n.a.      n.a.
64M     1999       n.a.      n.a.
256M     2000       n.a.      n.a.
At this moment the 16Mbit density is being replaced by the
64Mbit density, while the 128Mbit begins to ship in volume
causing the 64Mbit density to peak near the end of 2000.
 
The US firms have dominated the market since its inception at
the beginning of 1970, in particular through INTEL, the
inventor of the DRAM. Intel had the leadership in product
innovation for the first three generations. 
In the early 1970s the US enjoyed a 70% share in the world
market, which was less than $5 billion. 
Once large Japanese companies had acquired the necessary
process technology and production experience, they entered
into DRAM production and invested heavily in capacity. In the
late 1970s the US was losing its lead and were overtaken by
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Japanese firms in 1986.
Because of the intensity of price competition most of the US
firms (including INTEL) abandoned the DRAM production. Until
1994 the DRAM market has been dominated by Japanese companies. 
In 1980, Japan accounted for about 30% of the memory market.
By 1989 they accounted for more than 80%. Thus, during this
period, the US moved from being the dominant producer in both
memory and more sophisticated chips to being dominant only in
the latter.  
The rapid emergence of the Japanse industry as a world-class
competitor was a planned result of a concerted policy effort
of the Japanese government employing a variety of policy
tools. The Japanese government principally through MITI
pursued three sets of policies.
* Controlled access, i.e. controlling the links between the
Japanese market and international markets by limiting foreign
competition in the domestic market through a closure of
domestic markets to imports, reinforcing "buy Japan" policies,
acquiring foreign technology and know-how in the form of
patents, licenses and expertise, and initiating barriers to
foreign direct investment.
* Manipulating the domestic firms to stimulate expansion by
R&D subsidies, special depreciation tax breaks and subsidized
loans from public development banks for electronics in general
and semiconductors in particular. 
* The government through MITI reduced the cost of the riskiest
and least predictable phase of the R&D process through support
of a joint research venture, the Very Large Scale Integration
(VLSI) project which encouraged the diffusion of the generic
technologies with wide application and common product
techniques. VLSI devices have up to 100,000 circuit elements
on a single chip. The VLSI project of cooperative research was
wildly successful, producing more than 1000 patents and played
a key role in making Japanese firms leaders in semiconductor
manufacturing in the 1980s. A concrete effect of the program
was the creation of technical information flows between
Japanese equipment and materials suppliers and IC producers.
Product development was left entirely to the firms. The
subsidies under the VLSI were not especially large, but were
conditional on a commitment to commercialize resulting
innovations. 
Various "intrinsic" learning advantages of Japanese firms have
contributed importantly to their new positions as dominant
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suppliers in this market. Japanese engineers and production
workers have greater attachment to their employers so that
with the lower turnover and continuity in workforce learning
processes are more effective. Because Japanese chip producers
were part of larger systems houses they were getting access to
leading-edge products before their foreign competitors. This
also has put US and other foreign systems houses at a
competitive disadvantage. 
Therefore, a classic strategy of infant-industry protection
and promotion in Japan created a competitive Japanese
industry. Due to dynamic economies of scale import protection
became a policy of export promotion.
 
With the growth of the protected Japanese market and the
success of the Japanese challenge began a 15-year struggle by
the USA to open the Japanese market and to counteract alleged
predatory Japanese dumping practices.
In the USA the captive producers were cautious about
initiating any trade dispute with Japan. Not only did IBM have
substantial investments in Japan, but as a net purchaser it
had little interest in policies that might result in higher
prices. It were the merchant firms like Motorola which wanted
to diminish Japanese competition and to raise the price of
their output. 
In the last few years since 1992 the US has recovered overall
market share and took back the lead in terms of where chips
are produced.
6. Causes of the Decline in US Competitiveness.
Much of the loss of market share experienced by US high-
technology firms during the 1980s derived not from a shortage
of innovative capability, but from notoriously poor production
yields, low production quality and fluctuating production
capacity. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s US semiconductor firms
maintained a bifurcated manufacturing system with one segment
oriented toward innovation and new product development, the
other focused on reducing the production costs of existing
products. 
This organizational separation of technology development and
production generated serious problems of "manufacturability".
There was a fundamental tension between the drive to reduce
costs on existing products and pressures to introduce new
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products and production processes. The design of new devices
proceeded with insufficient input from production engineers
concerning the possibility of achieving high yields on
different product technologies. 
In response to rising land and labour costs and to associated
labour shortages in Silicon Valley, a locational dispersal of
routinized assembly activities took place. Routinized high-
volume fabrication facilities were located at dispersed low-
wage sites outside the major metropolitan areas in the USA,
and labour-intensive assembly operations at low-wage locations
offshore, while R&D and innovation remained clustered in core
locations. Figure 17 illustrates this point. In 1992 in
semiconductors, California had the highest share of US
employment of 29.4%, followed by Texas (14.7%), New York
(10.2%), Arizona (9.7%) and Massachusetts (6.5%).
  
However, under conditions of rapid technological change, this
geographical separation of production and innovation generated
serious difficulties in transferring new technologies from the
laboratory to the factory floor. 
Therefore, the organizational and geographical separation of
technology development and production undermined the ability
of US firms to codevelop both new products and new production
capability. 
The Japanese challenge was aimed at the weakest link in the US
semiconductor industry, namely, production. Japan's rapid
penetration of advanced integrated-circuit product markets was
the result of a complex set of factors, including low capital
costs, a protected domestic market, and a willingness at times
to sell below production cost in order to capture market
share, i.e. to engage in dumping. 
Underlying much of the success of Japanese firms was a close
integration of technology development and production
activities. Japanese firms were committed to production as
opposed to the tendency in the USA to accord higher priority
to product technology. The Japanese commitment to device
performance and technological sophistication was balanced by a
concern for the manufacturability of products and the
development of product and process technologies that allowed
for high yields in production. 
This involved the use of conservative circuit designs, scaling
up from existing technology wherever possible to minimize
device failure. The Japanese were further down the learning
curve and had fine-tuned the fabrication line to eliminate
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many sources of device-failure. The high yields by Japanese
firms reflected quality control and investment in production
automation.
In contrast, most US producers employed more complex circuit
designs encountering serious yield problems. 
Close relations between semiconductor firms and equipment
suppliers were another characteristic of semiconductor
manufacturing in Japan, which facilitated investments in new
equipment technologies and supported the emergence of a strong
equipment industry, that contributed to the Japanese success
in DRAMs. 
Relations between US semiconductor firms and equipment
suppliers were often strained. Rather than developing long-
term partnership agreements with equipment suppliers, US
semiconductor firms switched among many competing firms in a
search for the most advanced technology. In addition, they
transferred much of the cost of fluctuating demand to their
equipment suppliers in the form of cancelled or reduced orders
for capital equipment. Quick to double orders in boom times,
device makers moved even faster to cancel during the bust.  
This undermined the ability of suppliers to finance the
development of next-generation manufacturing technologies.
A final factor helping to secure greater market share for
Japanese firms was the large integrated organizational
structure of Japanese semiconductor firms (Keiretsu system)
which created low cost of capital and placed them in a
stronger position for dealing with a recession. They benefited
from an internal price discount allowing a rapid moving down
the learning curve. 
Japanese semiconductor manufacturers recognizing quality as a
strategic weapon adopted Statistical Process Control (SPC),
Total Quality Management (TQM) and Total Preventive
Maintenance (TPM) into their semiconductor operations in order
to reduce process variance and defects and to improve the
reliability of their semiconductor equipment.
7. Recovery of US competitiveness.
The reasons why the US semiconductor industry succeeded in
recovering from the loss of competitiveness can be carried
back to factors at the firm level, at the policy level and
industry level.  
In response to the competition from Japan, from the mid-1980s
onward, the majority of US semiconductor firms initiated a
major restructuring of their manufacturing operations in order
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to increase yields and improve production quality. Much of the
attention of US semiconductor firms is now focused not in the
research laboratory but on the factory floor; the ability to
stabilize new technologies in production and then to ramp up
rapidly to high-yield production is central to the process of
continuous innovation. Increased emphasis is placed on the
simultaneous development of new technologies and improved
production processes.
Manufacturing systems were reintegrated and recentralized
around a core of ongoing innovation along Japanese lines. This
"Japanization" involved much closer cooperative ties among
customers, producers and equipment suppliers and the creation
of multidimensional product teams on the basis of "flexible
lean production". Locational decisions were driven no longer
by factor input costs but rather by issues of communication
and learning. A shortage of fabrication capacity has been
avoided by heavily investing during recessions.  
These actions have substantially improved manufacturing
performance in the USA. While the yields of Japanese
semiconductor firms remain somewhat higher than those of their
US competitors, the gap has substantially narrowed. Product
defects in the US declined from an average of 170-190 parts-
per-million in 1986 to an average of 50-60 parts-per-million
in 1990. Probe yields of US firms increased from 60% in 1986
to 84% in 1991. During the same period, yields achieved by
Japanese firms increased from 75% to 93%, thus narrowing the
difference in yields from 15% in 1986 to 9% in 1991.
This reduction in the yield differential enhanced the ability
of US firms to compete with Japanese producers during the late
1980s. 
8. Semiconductor Trade Agreements and their Evaluation.   
At the policy level the conclusion of bilateral trade
agreements with Japan is a second factor contributing to the
recovery of competitiveness. 
In the USA the industry recession of 1981, when the Japanese
companies attacked the international market for the first
time, created demands by US semiconductor producers for trade
relief. Steeply falling prices for semiconductors along with
the early Japanese capture of 70% of the US market for 64K
DRAMs triggered a political response by the US industry. 
However, the regular trips by representatives of the
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) to Washington got a
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cool reception there.  
* The Reagan administration had a rhetorical commitment to
free trade and confronting US producers with a rude shock of
foreign competition and a healthy dose of competition was no
cause for alarm.
* The US semiconductor industry was hardly on its deathbed:
the merchant industry was still profitable. 
In 1985 the market situation changed dramatically as the
electronics industry throughout the world entered a deep
recession that lasted until the middle of 1987. In an effort
to maintain sales volume, both US and Japanese producers cut
prices which for 64 DRAMs fell from $4.00 in 1984 to $1.00 in
1985. 
The industry recession in 1985 was extremely severe and
concentrated on the memory chip market. It pushed virtually
every US producer out of the DRAM market. Only TI and Micron
remained in the merchant DRAM market, although IBM and AT&T
continued captive production. Imports were not a direct cause
of the industry recession: Japanese penetration actually fell
in the two years after 1984. 
In 1985 the famous cross-over occurred. The trending down of
the American market share and the going up of Japan's has been
called the X-curve. By the end of the decade, Japanese firms
held in excess of 70% of the world market for DRAM integrated
circuits. 
In 1985 the descent of the semiconductor industry to
Washington received a much warmer welcome than in 1982.
In 1982, the industry was split on filing an antidumping
petition and faced resistance by the Administration on any
Section 301 action; in 1985, its course of action has been
largely welcomed by the government, having to do with the
appreciation of the US dollar and the large trade deficit.
US firms complained about two issues: a lack of access to the
Japanese market and dumping by Japanese firms.
* By the end of the 1970s US threats had already led Japan to
eliminate all formal trade barriers on semiconductors, so that
equal opportunities had been created. Since this did not lead
to a rise in US semiconductor exports US industry shifted to
demanding equal outcomes. In order to increase the market
share of US firms a Section 301 action of the Trade Act of
1974 against Japan was prepared that should make "the cash
registers ring". Actually the relatively small US market share
in Japan had to be explained by quality and marketing
deficiencies.
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The SIA based its demands on the now familiar "market share
shuffle", in which Washington cites a low market share in
Japan as proof of a rigged economy. This would strongly
suggest that market barriers existed in Japan, although no
specific impediment to imports could be identified. However,
if captive production (that is chips produced by Japanese
semiconductor firms for own use) is excluded from the count,
American firms already had about a 20% share of the Japanese
market in 1985. This was about the same as the Japanese share
of the American market at the time.
* US semiconductor firms claimed that Japanese firms should be
penalized for their unfair practices of dumping 64K DRAMs at
less than fair value, with fair value being defined as the
price required to gain a normal rate of return from the
production and sale of DRAM devices. Between June and December
1985 a series of antidumping and unfair trade practice suits
have been filed in the US, charging Japanese firms with
dumping 64K DRAM chips and EPROMs. Even the Department of
Commerce, unprecedentedly, initiated own dumping complaints
against Japanese firms.
 
Although prices for these chips in the US market actually have
been marginally higher than prevailing prices in the Japanese
market, (the exact opposite of the traditional concept of
dumping defined as sales abroad at less than home market
prices), the US complainant charged that Japanese chips were
being sold at prices not covering the full costs of
production, the new definition of dumping in the US trade
laws. 
In June 1986 the ITC found that Japanese firms were selling
DRAMs and EPROMs at a weighted average of 20.75% less than
fair value and tariffs were recommended on Japanese imports
equal to the margin of dumping ranging from 10.9% to 35.3%.   
However, in fact this would be an empty victory due to the
speed at which this industry evolves. The ruling should come
into effect after the industry would have moved on to the next
generation (256K). In the USA it takes a full year to process
antidumping complaints. 
This is too long for domestic US HT industries with their
short product cycles where foreign producers may cease dumping
one product and move on to selling its next-generation
successor by the time an antidumping case has run its course.
Then there would be few imports on which to impose the dumping
margins. Therefore, fast track dumping procedures would be
required to avoid that domestic suppliers are exiting
production such as in DRAMs with its delayed antidumping
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remedy.    
In DRAMs the antidumping provisions would be applied late and
would encourage anticompetitive cooperation and collusion
among Japanese suppliers, while in EPROMS they would be
applied early enough to deter dumping and to encourage
competition. 
An alternative to antidumping duties could have been a
countervailing US subsidy to offset the injury to US DRAM
producers. But this was a nonstarter given the ideological and
budgetary climate prevailing in the US in 1986.
 
Another problem with the dumping charges was that the
definition by the US Department of Commerce of "fair value" as
average cost plus an 8% markup for normal profit did not take
into consideration the existence of learning economies. It did
not admit a role for "forward pricing". Forward pricing means
that prices are set to yield a profit when total revenues and
costs are summed up over the entire product cycle. Forward
pricing is normal in a learning industry, i.e. selling at a
price below current static marginal and average cost. Below
fair market pricing by the Japanese was simply an indication
of learning, whereby American authorities reached an incorrect
conclusion. When fixed investments in R&D are very large in
relation to a firm's sales, such as in the semiconductor
industry which spends almost 15% of sales on R&D, there is a
significant gap between short-run average cost and long-run
average cost, and long-run marginal cost may fall
significantly below short-run marginal cost. In this case
rational firms engage in forward pricing, that is choose
output levels where marginal revenue lies below their current
short-run marginal cost, while marginal revenue equal terminal
(not current) marginal cost. Figure 18 illustrates these
points. 
While the ITC found that many Japanese companies were selling
their semiconductors in the US at prices below their
calculated production costs, there was little evidence that
this was done to undercut the prices of US producers. Instead,
it was more the result of intensive competition within Japan
and of a drop in demand for personal computers in the mid-
1980s, which caused the prices for chips to fall rapidly. In
order to cut their losses, many Japanese semiconductor firms
which had overproduced and had bulging inventories sought to
cut their losses by quickly selling off their stockpiles.    
In this case low prices have been confused with predatory
pricing while Japanese firms legitimately tried to capture the
economies of learning by doing. Therefore, in the case of
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learning by doing pricing below marginal cost is normal
business practice that should not be condemned as dumping or
predation. Dumping should be assessed on basis of actual price
differences between markets and not on basis of constructed
cost measures, at least not in the way the ITC did it.
 
Although the Electronic Industry Association of Japan (EIAJ)
and the SIA kept the international trade lawyers busy by
filing counterbriefs to each other's briefs, in the end the
pressures to move forward with a significant market-opening
initiative against Japan triumphed.
In order to short-cut subsequent legal actions Japan moved to
reach a bilateral settlement with the USA.
 
Besides an exchange rate policy aimed at reducing the foreign
exchange value of the dollar, the US Administration formulated
a two-pronged policy:
* Market-opening initiatives aimed at diverting protectionist
pressures by focusing on measures to open up the Japanese
market rather than closing the US market.  This led to the
conclusion of the Semiconductor Trade Agreement (SCTA) with
Japan in 1986, which has been renewed in 1991 and 1996. With
the signing of the SCTA on September 2, 1986 the actual
imposition of antidumping tariff penalties was avoided and the
dumping cases involving 256K DRAM chips and EPROMs were
suspended. 
* The provision of multi-year financing for a consortium of US
semiconductor firms created in 1987 to develop new process
technology: SEMATECH.
8.1. Contents of the SCTA.  
The 1986 SCTA contained eight provisions equally divided 
between a price-fixing part and a market-sharing component. 
1) The SCTA established an explicit price floor for
semiconductors intended to promote competition by halting
predatory dumping practices: this amounted to a voluntary
export restraint (VER) by Japan. Japan would provide the US
with cost information necessary to calculate price floors for
DRAMs and agreed not to sell products at prices below these
values. 
2) The SCTA contained provisions aimed at doubling the US
market share in Japan by 1991 to counter the alleged market
closure: this amounted to a voluntary import expansion by 
Japan (VIE). 
A secret side-letter to the Agreement called for increasing
the foreign share to 20 percent by 1992. This secrecy allowed
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both sides to maintain their public commitment to the
principles of free trade and to deny that they had carved up
markets in a managed trade agreement. However, the effect was
asymmetric: Japan denied there was any explicit commitment
about guaranteeing a market share, while the US held Japan
accountable for such a commitment though it could not produce
the text in public to support its position. US negotiators
interpreted the accord as a guarantee that Japan would
increase its consumption of US semiconductors to the 20%
level, while Japanese negotiators interpreted the figure as a
goal that might or might not be met, depending on the demand
for US semiconductors in Japan. Therefore, there was a
fundamental misunderstanding about what was involved. Japan
regarded the 20 percent figure as a target at which to aim,
while the US considered it a firm commitment - and a minimum
one - which the Japanese had promised to fulfill.
8.2. Subsequent events.
There were almost immediately problems. While the artifical
controls drove up chip prices sharply in the US, the market
distortions created an arbitrageur's dream. Some of the
arbitrageurs (more commonly known as smugglers) took advantage
of the bargain basement prices in Japan, where the average
chip cost at least $2 less than elsewhere, and flew hither and
yon with satchels and suitcases stuffed with semiconductors.
One bag of smuggled chips might save a savvy buyer from the US
or Europe tens of thousands of dollars. 
To implement the Agreement MITI established a production
cartel issuing quarterly forecasts of chip demand and
production. It should be recalled that in Japan no specific
impediments to imports could be identifed so that Tokyo had no
effective means of rectifying the situation. Amazingly, the
cartel was greeted by screams from the SIA that MITI was
trying to create "artificial shortages". In February 1987,
MITI began issuing "requests" for production cutbacks which
were met by the following month. 
The regulation of Japanese export sales implied the adoption
of an export licensing system in combination with certificates
of Japanese origin. MITI had to register foreign purchases of
Japanese chips and established informal regional allocation
guidelines to prevent diversion of exports from one export
market to another.
Initially, prices remained low and the US warned Japan that it
was not adhering to the Agreement.
In 1987 US firms accused Japan of violating the agreement by
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selling DRAMs at below fair value in third markets (primarily
Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries). Then Oki Electric
was lured into documenting sales at less than fair market
value in Hong Kong. In the spring of 1987 the USA responded by
imposing punitive duties on $300 million of Japanese exports
to the USA on power tools, computers, and TV sets to the US.
Tariffs were deliberately not set on semiconductors themselves
because they were essential to many American user businesses.
The retaliation had two apparent effects.
1) The US share of the Japanese market began to rise;
2) The prices of chips began to rise and Japanese chips cost
American computer manufacturers 30% to 40% more than before
the SCTA. Personal computer prices shot up drastically in the
late 1980s, almost destroying America's competitiveness in
this high-tech product area.
The US government reversed course and asked MITI to abandon
the price production controls and in November 1987 it
partially removed the spring tariff sanctions.
From 1987 through 1988 in DRAMs the overall price pattern was
one of significant regional price differentials in contract
pricing between the domestic Japanese and overseas markets,
which, however, disappeared in 1989 due to a slackenig of
demand. This may suggest that government price and export
controls in Japan were relatively effective in controlling
direct transactions between Japanese producers and their
customers. However, this did not apply for the secondary spot
market where arbitrage equalized prices. Figure 19 illustrates
this situation.
Even after MITI ended its guidance and the chip market began
to weaken in 1989, Japanese producers implemented cutbacks in
DRAM production to boost prices and they made excessive
profits on global sales of $4 billion between 1987-91, which
were ploughed back in R&D further improving Japan's
competitive position. R&D expenditures in chips in Japan
exceeded those in the US by $2 billion in 1988.
Coincident with the implementation period of the SCTA there
was increased activity by US firms to penetrate the Japanese
market. This was accompanied by a plethora of tie-ups and
joint activities between Japanese and US firms. It is
difficult to say how many of these were due to the SCTA and
how many would have occurred anyway in response to business
conditions. In our opinion they were very important for US
semiconductor firms to regain competitiveness. 
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When the agreement was signed in 1986 US semiconductor firms
had a market share in Japan of 8.6%, which increased to 14.3%
by the third quarter of 1991, so that by that time only half
of the desired 12% increase in US market share has been
achieved. As the market access target of 20% had not been met
in the summer of 1991, the USA and Japan entered a new round
of negotiations on semiconductor trade. 
In August 1991 a second five-year agreement was signed between
the USA and Japan, which endorsed the existing target of a 20%
market share for USA producers by the end of 1992.
The agreement abandoned the flawed VER policy of price floors
because American using computer firms were hurt by the price
floor. However, Japanese firms were still required to collect
production cost information to be provided to the US
government on occasion of future dumping charges. 
Although the US market share in the fourth quarter of 1992
reached 20.2% (while in the first three quarters of 1993 it
fell to 18.1%) this cannot be called a temporary success
because it resulted from a modest rise of American exports to
Japan and a contraction in the total market for chips in
Japan. In other words, the numerator rose slightly while the
denominator fell strongly.
Although the VER part had been abandoned, in reality if Japan
would produce too much or export at too low a price, it would
be subjected to immediate US dumping complaints.
With the price floors removed, the price of DRAMS fell
substantially during 1991-92, driven down in large part by
emergent South Korean  producers. History almost repeated
itself. 
In April 1992 Micron Technologies filed an antidumping
petition against three Korean manufacturers (Goldstar, Hyundai
and Samsung). The higher duties would force one large US
computer manufacturer, AST Research, to move 700 production
jobs overseas. In exchange for US suspension of the
antidumping case, Korea was in favor of embracing a managed-
trade agreement modelled after the 1986-1991 SCTA with Japan.
However, an agreement was never signed because of opposition
by Micron Technology which in April 1992 had filed an
antidumping petition against South Korea. It felt secure
behind high antidumping duties imposed against Korea and was
unaffected by the prospective Korean market-opening actions. 
In October 1992, the Commerce Department announced dumping
margins as high as 87% against Samsung, Goldstar and Hyundai.
However, in May 1993 the Commerce Department revised its
preliminary antidumping fines drastically downward so that
Micron was deprived of its anticipated protection.
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8.3. Renewal of the SCTA in 1996.
Until mid July 1996 the achievements of the SCTA were limited
according to the Americans. The 20% target represented a
relatively modest market share. Even though this immediate
goal has been met, there was little evidence of a structural
change in trading relations. Therefore, additional aggressive
intervention, ("cautious activism") by the US government had
to be pursued. 
In contrast to the Bush administration, which tried to win
trade concessions by demanding reciprocity, the Clinton
administration is using the principle of comparable access
with market share as the yardstick by which the efficacy of
its trading partners' market opening efforts are measured.
The US government officials issued statements supporting
renewal of the SCTA. The Clinton Administration believed that
the success of America's semiconductor industry was the result
of the SCTA. However, it is not. The US semiconductor industry
is successful today because it sought joint ventures with
Japanese firms which gave American firms access to the
Japanese market. 
It was hard to picture a US industry less in need of
government assistance. The US semiconductor industry was made
up of companies with strong earnings and a bright future, not
companies that were in need of assistance from the federal
government in the form of an affirmative action program to
help them sell products to Japan. 
Given the last decade's massive changes, US producers would
seem to have little to complain about regarding access to
Japan or, indeed, any other country in the world. With high
prices and record profits, the American companies would seem
to have nothing to complain about. This should remove the
entire raison d'être for the renewal of the semiconductor
agreement. The best rationale supporters of a renewal offered
was that an extension was somehow necessary to preserve and
consolidate past gains by the US industry, what had been
dubbed the "chicken soup" argument (as in: it could not hurt). 
     
The US position with respect to Japan suggested a fixing of
the actual 30% level as the floor and measuring ongoing
"progress" to infinitely as a way to expand its foreign market
share in Japan. 
However, in 1996, the SIA ignored its earlier assertion, made
in 1990, that the 20% market share contained in the SCTA was a
threshold after which market forces should be permitted to
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take over and operate. With the foreign market share at nearly
30%, the SIA wanted even more, arguing that its market share
should be much higher.
In 1996, the Japanese market was fully open; the foreign
market share in Japan for semiconductors had more than tripled
over the past ten years from 9% in 1986 to more than 30%. 
Since then the market for semiconductors had become global.
There had been a dramatic growth in international business
partnerships and a tremendous expansion of the Asian
semiconductor industry. Japanese firms worked side by side
with their foreign partners in all aspects of semiconductor
development, production and marketing.  
Therefore, a multilateral approach would be essential, as a
bilateral agreement could no longer adequately address the
evolving requirements of a dynamic, rapidly changing global
industry. The Japanese government did propose the formation of
a "Global Governmental Forum on the Semiconductor Industry",
with the US, Japan and the European Union as founding members.
On August 2, 1996, a new Semiconductor Trade Agreement has
been concluded consolidating the situation at that time with
two separate accords:
* a government-to-government pact that turns most
responsibilities over to the industries of the two countries
setting up the Global Governmental Forum (GGF) and,
* an industry-to-industry agreement that outlines steps to be
taken and establishes a similar industry forum, the
Semiconductor Council, that will consider broad semiconductor
policy issues. 
Under the new agreement, industries will collect a variety of
data, including foreign market share, and report their
findings to governments.
Governments will review the semiconductor market structure
using both qualitative and quantitative factors to ensure  the
maintenance of open and competitive markets without
discrimination based on capital affiliation.
While the new agreement preserves a bilateral aspect, it
provides for the participation of other semiconductor
producers in a new multilateral forum. Countries or trading
blocs such as the European Union would be invited to join the
global groups provided they eliminate semiconductor tariffs.  
8.4. Evaluation of the SCTA. 
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Given the innovative nature of the SCTA and the obvious
interest in applying this approach to other sectoral disputes,
a careful evaluation is warranted.
Firstly, considerable dispute arose over the extent to which
price floors were to be applied to sales in third-country
markets. The SCTA was the first bilateral deal to explicitly
involve monitoring of third-party markets.
The USA announced sanctions against third-country dumping
applied to Japan. In reaction, the Japanese government through
MITI kept pressure ("provided guidance") on firms to hold
production and investment in new capacity down and this
brought third-country prices up to US levels.
Secondly, a point overlooked by the Americans was that
Japanese suppliers choose to cooperate rather than compete.
Since the 1986 SCTA, Japanese DRAM manufacturers moved from
competing for market share to market sharing. Japanese chip
producers were collectively cutting back production to achieve
high price stabilization allowing bubble profits. In contrast,
in the EPROM market, where non-Japanese suppliers held 40% of
het market, there was no effective cooperation among the
Japanese suppliers.
Although there is no direct evidence to examine the
credibility of allegations of this collusive behavior in
DRAMs, fact is that in early 1988 spot prices for DRAMs in the
US soared to historically unprecedented levels and the US
computer industry was plunged into crisis; producers scrambled
for supplies of critical memory chips.
Thirdly, in the SCTA's antidumping provisions the Japanese
agreed to increase their prices, in return of which the USA
dropped their dumping charges. By the time prices began to
rise in the USA all of the major US manufacturers had already
withdrawn from DRAM production. 
However, the American computer industry strongly opposed the
antidumping provisions because it had been harmed by the sharp
runup in DRAM prices. The price floor amounted to an annual
tax of $500-600 million on US computer buyers. The boosting of
DRAM prices created windfall profits for Japanese chip
manufacturers which made them more productive. Therefore, in
DRAMs de SCTA's antidumping provisions actually made matters
worse by creating a price floor policy which made the US a
high-cost production location. The SCTA has put downstream
users of semiconductors at a competitive disadvantage and
encouraged computer firms to move production abroad. 
Fourthly, the SCTA's greatest benefit of the USA in the long
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run may be that it encouraged substantial foreign direct
investment (FDI) by Japanese firms in the USA. During the mid-
1980s, all of the major Japanese semiconductor firms opened
fabrication facilities in the USA, primarily for the
production of DRAM devices. 
Fifthly, the access provisions for penetrating the Japanese
market are very controversial. The 1986-SCTA was a departure
in US trade policy. It sought to expand  access for American
chip exports to a foreign high-technology product market,
rather than to reduce foreign access to the US market. It
became the first US example of a VIE measure. 
Although VIEs were designed to increase trade and competition
in countries in which structural impediments limit access for
foreign suppliers, they are to be criticized because they
result in the cartelization of markets; they increase prices
by limiting competition; they are subject to capture by
producer interests in the importing or exporting country; they
increase the risks of retaliation if the targets are not met;
they can create dangerous precedents that could come back to
haunt the demandeur and they violate the principle of non-
discrimination. 
Moreover, VIE import targets are arbitrary on several
dimensions. The particular commodities that come under the
scope of a VIE are arbitrary. The broader the industrial
aggregate chosen for an import target, the more arbitrary the
VIE becomes by including different types of goods. 
US competitors are not necessarily competitive in all product
segments and not all those segments may be appropriate to the
needs of the foreign market.
No satisfactory methodology can calculate the target market
share; its choice therefore is inherently arbitrary and devoid
of any serious economic foundation. 
Furthermore, there is the question of what criteria are used
in picking and choosing the industries to benefit from US
government action. The arbitrary nature of selecting
industries for VIEs raises the possibility that political
pressure results in the wrong sectors chosen for a VIE. 
There is an inherent uncertainty surrounding the import
target. The problem is whether failure to satisfy the import
target is evidence of Japanese recalcitrance, or is the target
set at the wrong level, or has the composition of demand in
the Japanese market changed? Any shortfall is ground for
complaint by the USA and any increase is hailed by Japan as
progress.
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VIEs may not increase competition but merely create rents for
the first few foreign (US) firms that are beneficiaries of the
action, especially if they are imperfectly competitive and
recognize their bargaining power vis-à-vis their Japanese
customers and if they already have long-standing direct
investments in Japan with selling advantages over other US
rivals. 
The VIE may be a facilitating practice that fosters collusion,
just like VERs. The act of the Japanese government forcing
Japanese firms to reduce their domestic sales and to share the
market with foreign rivals has given rise to a more
coordinated and more collusive interplay between foreign and
Japanese firms. In the end, competition may not have been
enhanced, only profits will be shared.
VIEs are likely to become managed trade in the worst sense.
They require substantial government intervention to become
effective, depending on explicit and continual administrative
or enforcement actions. Imports must be rationed and allocated
among domestic consumers to satisfy the market share target.
Such results-based trade policy is not about opening markets
at all; it is about granting special favors to prominent and
politically powerful US industries. To be credible, the VIE
must be backed by the implicit or explicit threat of
retaliation in case of noncompliance. 
VIEs may degenerate into discriminatory and preferential
treatment for certain suppliers, leading to trade diversion,
constituting export protectionism for US producers. The
Japanese government and firms interpret the VIE as encouraging
imports principally from the USA. Japan recognized that the
pressure to import more arose almost exclusively from the USA. 
VIEs make a country believe that it can achieve market opening
without reciprocal liberalization, reducing support for the
open multilateral system. VIEs are inherently bilateral and
damage third countries. As the setting of import targets by
two countries is perceived by other countries as fixing market
shares to their detriment, bilateral trade restrictions tend
to spread. Other countries interpreted the VIE as a preference
to US firms. Hence, the EU has pressed for an own market share
target of 5% in Japan. Its market share in Japan was only 1%,
while its share outside Europe and Japan was 5%.
Therefore, VIEs tends to carve up world markets by political
fiat and pressure. Smaller and weaker countries with less
political and economic influence are left behind to fight over
the remaining scraps of the market. This threatens the WTO
system. 
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Finally, blaming unfair discrimination abroad or unfair
practices for one's own economic shortcomings is an easy way
to avoiding serious discussion of domestic solutions. The
intense obsession and focus on Japan's hidden practices
reinforced the faulty notion that Japan could be blamed for
the economic shortcomings of the USA.
If the USA wants to reduce its current account deficit,
reduction of the fiscal deficit and the promotion of domestic
savings are a vastly superior approach to VIEs. 
It may be expected that once its own house is in order, the
political pressures for the management of international trade
will subside. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that for importing countries
VIEs and VERs have negative welfare consequences, which may be
measured in terms of the familiar changes in consumer and
producer surplus and which also encompass unfavorable terms of
trade effects.
9. Strategic alliances.
Today the US semiconductor industry is more competitive and
prosperous than it was before the SCTA. Now it is the world's
largest producer of semiconductors.
Since the 1986-SCTA the nature of competition in the
semiconductor industry has clearly altered as is indicated by
the proliferation of joint ventures between the US and
Japanese firms. The manifold joint ventures have diminished
the high degree of rivalry between US and Japanese firms. 
America's renewed success in Japan has occurred because of
private sector initiatives by US and Japanese companies to
work together in strategic alliances and joint ventures and
despite the US government's managed trade policies. In fact
American chip manufacturers had lost interest in gaining a 20
percent share in Japan even before the semiconductor talks in
1986 opened. Due to the enormous amount of money being poured
into research and development, more and more Japanese and US
chip makers were putting aside their past rivalry and forming
cooperative alliances. Figure 20 illustrates the situation
already existing in 1990.
The key technological and manufacturing reasoning underlying
the formation of interfirm partnerships has been the shift to
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) production and submicron
fabrication. This shift has led to a rapid increase in the
costs of R&D, equipment, and facilities, as well as to an
increase in the risk of market failure. Mass volume sales
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constitute the sine qua non of low-cost production and of
moving rapidly down steep learning curves. Therefore, it is
essential to find ways of getting close to foreign customers.
Because the up-front costs and risks of breaking into foreign
markets can be prohibitively high, there are strong incentives
for companies to find foreign partners through strategic
alliances. Companies cannot afford to confine themselves to
domestic markets, no matter how large they may be.
Not all alliances have to last forever to be considered
successful. Constantly changing market forces make long-lived
alliance a thing of the past. 
Successful alliances need dedicated resources. An alliance is
not a way to divest yourself of applying resources to
something; it is a way of leveraging those resources toward
accomplishing a goal. Alliances should be established from a
position of strength, not from a defensive posture to stave
off a threat to business. Many alliances crumble under the
weight of any of a number of factors: poor management, a lack
of clear goals at the outset, the growing dominance of one
partner and the drain on resources by another, and the failure
to adequately measure a partnership's performance. With the
change for failure so high, the sheer number of alliances
being formed is a wonder. In industry at large, the average
company that had no alliances a decade ago has more than 30
today, according to Andersen Consulting. 
Alliances remain so popular because of the allure of
flexibility, informality, speed and efficiency. As technology
becomes more complex, costly and speculative and as customers
demand more integrated tools, semiconductor equipment and
materials companies appear to be pursuing alliances in record
numbers. Alliances with competitors are a newer strategy in
the equipment and materials sector than in the integrated
device manufacturer side of the equation.
The vast majority of US-Japan alliances is between small- or
medium-sized US companies, (many of them young start-ups) and
large, vertically integrated, diversified Japanese
corporations, the kaisha . Small venture start-up firms in the
US in need of funds, manufacturing foundries and marketing
outlets, look to large deep-pocketed vertically integrated and
diversified Japanese corporations to meet these needs.
Many of the large Japanese giants look to small US start-ups
to provide new product designs to fill niche markets or to
compensate for certain deficiencies in their own innovative
capabilities.
Partnership agreements between US design houses and foreign
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wafer fabrication foundries represent a substantial proportion
of the total number of strategic alliances established during
the 1980s.
Interestingly, one of the driving forces behind the US-Japan
strategic alliances is the need for large Japanese
corporations outside electronics to diversify. In Japan
established steel and equipment companies are making the
transition into the high-tech world of semiconductors and
electronics. Perhaps the most obvious reason for this
diversification is the Japanese practice of lifetime
employment. When the core business loses comparative
advantage, the "kaisha" begin branching out into promising new
fields of business activity.
Diversification enables them to retain their work force,
utilize sunk investments and survive as corporate entities.
However, the spread of alliances raises concerns as well. The
prevailing flow of semiconductor technology through alliances
is from the US to Japan. At present the USA is trading product
design technology for Japanese process and manufacturing
technology. A largely one-sided outflow of technology from the
US to Japan, if continued over the 1990s, could have the
cumulative effect of eroding the foundations of America's
capacity to innovate in the industry, with serious
consequences for the US computer and telecommunications
companies that use semiconductors. Therefore, as US design
technology leadership is the cornerstone of US competitive
advantage, this may be a risky game. 
It is ironic that Japanese and American businesses have sought
ways to co-exist and cooperate in high technology, despite the
ups and downs in Japan-US political relations. If
relationships of this sort prosper, then at least one
Japanese-American trade sore may have healed itself. 
However, 1999 saw the begining of increased trade tensions
between the USA and the EU. Time and time again, the US arm-
in-arm with the EU have pressed their international allies to
liberalize trade and to open up their markets. A case in point
for the semiconductor and equipment industry was the
commitment to convince more than 40 countries in 1996 to sign
the Information Technology Agreement. That agreement
eliminated tariffs on nearly all information technology
products by 2000, including semiconductors and capital
equipment, covering more than 95 percent of world IT trade. 
As the semiconductor industry has globalized, most US
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manufacturers of semiconductor equipment and materials have
grown increasingly export-dependent. As a consequence, the
majority of large US exporters in the semiconductor industry
have formed Foreign Sales Corporations (FSC) which allow them
to exempt a portion of their export sales or lease revenues
from direct income taxes if those revenues were generated by
offshore subsidiaries. The number of FSCs has grown across the
US economy to include more than 5000 US companies and cover up
$200 billion in trade. This tax provision was established by
Congress in 1984 to ensure that US exporters, who are subject
to a system of direct taxation wherever their income is
generated, are not at a disadvantage relative to European
exporters that operate under a territorial tax system that
does not tax foreign-source income.
The EU protested its practice on the grounds that it
constitutes an export subsidy, which is prohibited under
Article XVI:4 of the WTO rules. In September 1999, the WTO
ruled that FSCs are indeed actually an illegal export subsidy
and had to be dismantled by October 1, 2000. However, the US
government filed an appeal of the WTO panel's decision, with
hearings held in late January. On 24 Februay 2000, the
Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding, to the
disappointment of the US, that the FSC measure constituted a
prohibited export subsidy.
10. Research Consortia and their Evaluation.
The semiconductor industry has pioneered in large-scale R&D
consortia. During the 1980s governments in the US, Japan and
Europe launced a myriad of cooperative R&D programs by
providing subsidies to firms enabling them to share the risks
and costs associated with technology generation.  
In Japan the government through the state-owned
telecommunications firm Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (NTT) in 1976 established the VLSI project and in
the US in 1987 SEMATECH has been launched.
The VLSI MITI-supported joint research effort in Japan was
organized around five companies and accounted for almost 40%
of Japan's national IC R&D effort in the late 1970s. The VLSI
project was conceived of as a catch-up program designed to
bring Japanese producers up to the standard of competence of
Western companies. It was not intended to produce major
breakthroughs in the fundamental technologies of the IC.
However, it extended and improved on technological concepts
already developed overseas. 
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By 1979 due to the objections raised by US industry and
government to the large scale of the subsidy for VLSI projects
the joint research lab was shut down. However, the Japanese
industry continued a private sector edition of the VLSI
project for another seven years, funded entirely out of its
own monies. Immediately after the VLSI joint lab was disbanded
two similar collaborative R&D labs were established as part of
new government-industry R&D initiatives. Joint research labs
have since become a familiar element of technology policy in
Japan.  
It may be concluded that the VLSI effort was an exceedingly
important boost to Japanese semiconductor technology. 
SEMATECH has played an important role in the revitalization of
the US chip industry. Although its role remains controversial,
the creation of SEMATECH, while focusing on the creation of
process technology, coincided with the resurgence of US chip
industry. 
The establishment of SEMATECH in 1987 represented a major
joint response of policy and industry to the decline in the US
semiconductor industry's performance. SEMATECH, located in
Austin, Texas, provides an example of the use of joint
development consortia among the American leading companies in
partnership with the US government to strengthen
competitiveness. It was granted antitrust immunity.
Its goal was to bring US semiconductor manufacturing
capability to equal or exceed the world's best, including the
design for manufacture as much as the manufacturing process
itself.
SEMATECH was not intended to manufacture any particular
product, or to develop specific processes for any product. It
is a non-profit organization, originally consisting of 11 US
companies, that is not permitted to sell chips. The original
mission of SEMATECH was to provide a research facility for
member firms to collaborate on projects to improve their
semiconductor manufacturing process technology.   
The benefit to corporations which contribute to SEMATECH
occurs from having access to newer equipment and processes six
to nine months before they are generally available, which may
be crucial for leading-edge product introductions.  
A main problem was that, although the development of advanced
manufacturing processes is crucial to the competitive
advantage of firms, member firms are reluctant to share such
sensitive information with other members.
59
Moreover, there was the danger that some firms could free ride
on the contributions of the technology leaders. 
Therefore, members questioned whether the development of
advanced manufacturing processes was an appropriate objective
for an industry consortium.
In response to these controversies, SEMATECH altered its
research agenda to one that sought to improve the
technological capabilities of US SMEs and to strengthen
vertical cooperation between US suppliers and users of
semiconductor process equipment. Within two years of
operation, the focus of the consortium changed from the on-
line testing and optimization of existing manufacturing
equipment to strengthening the SME industry.
Three firms have withdrawn from the consortium: Micron
Technology, LSI Logic and Harris Semiconductor, because of
their dissatisfaction with the consortium's decision not to
pursue the development of an advanced manufacturing process
that all members could apply.
US affiliates of foreign firms were not allowed to enter
SEMATECH. SEMATECH was not open to non-US firms, though there
has been some discussion with the European JESSI program over
mutual research interests. There were no restrictions on joint
ventures between SEMATECH members and foreign partners.
In 1994, with US semiconductor manufacturers and equipment
suppliers again atop the world market share charts, SEMATECH
considered it could fund itself and sought an end to federal
matching funding. In 1996 US Congress voted final funds for
SEMATECH.
The costly conversion to larger silicon wafers which is
altering many of the industry's manufacturing technologies has
given rise to new recently established consortia.
Two recent established consortia are the International 300mm
Inititiave (I300I) in the US, established in November 1995
comprising 13 leading device makers and Semiconductor Leading
Edge Technologies (SELETE) in Japan established in February
1996 by ten leading Japanese semiconductor firms. The aim of
these consortia was to upgrade the wafers from the standard
200mm to 300mm which should increase the yield in the number
of chips per wafer 2.6 times.
Unlike the VLSI project and SEMATECH, both I300I and SELETE
have been financed solely by member companies, including
semiconductor manufacturers from around the world. The
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development costs of 300mm tools require a radical overhaul of
equipment tool sets and are likely to exceed $10 billion, far
higher than the $1 billion cost of developing the 200mm tools
in the early 1980s. These consortia focus on vertical projects
aimed at ensuring the reliability and compatibility of
production tools. 
Moreover, the costs of individually leading these transitions
and "going it alone" to 300mm wafers outweigh the benefits of
having first mover access to the new capabilities. For the
first time leading international device makers developed a
uniform set of standards in advance of a major wafer
transition in order to avoid incompatible equipment.
Historically equipment suppliers have looked to device makers
for technical guidance in setting these standards and device
makers tried to speed tool development and reduce the costs of
obtaining a compatible tool set for next-generation fabs. 
I300I is an international subsidiary of SEMATECH and is housed
in the SEMATECH facility in Austin, Texas. To reduce the
danger that proprietary information will leak among competing
suppliers I300I has adopted a decentralized approach in which
most equipment projects take place at the facilities of
individual supplier firms instead of the consortium's common
facility. I300I evaluates tools for basic test parameters and
leaves the development and subsequent improvement of those
tools to suppliers. In contrast to SEMATECH which obtained 89
patents between 1989 and 1996, I300I did not expect to own any
intellectual property.
SELETE aims at both the evaluation and development of 300mm
tools and has an annual budget more than twice that of I300I.
In contrast to I300I SELETE is more centralized so that
equipment is evaluated in SELETE's central laboratory at
Hitachi. The risk of technology leakage among supplier firms
is greater than in the case of I300I. SELETE also generates
jointly owned intellectual property.
Both consortia are pursuing an open policy of evaluating tools
from suppliers worldwide. E.g., in 1997 Canon shipped a 300mm
lithography system for testing to I300I. 
Recently the transition to 300mm wafers has been delayed due
to a combination of technical and economic factors. Faster-
than-expected reductions in the line widths of circuit
patterns have permitted more chips to fit onto each 200mm
wafer which extended the life of 200mm fabs and equipment.
Moreover, the Asian financial crisis has constrained the
61
capital expenditures of Asian companies. As a consequence,
high-volume 300mm production is not expected until 2002. This
sudden change in market outlook for 300mm technologies
illustrates an insufficiently appreciated risk of industry-
wide collaboration in a fundamental uncertain environment.
Therefore, industry-wide collaboration may increase the
collective exposure of firms to unexpected developments. 
The I300I program represented for the first time that leading
semiconductor firms from seven countries can agree to conduct
joint projects. This relatively high level of international
cooperation among competing manufacturers is without parallel
in the history. 
I300I demonstrates that the role of government in this
industry is diminishing. 
With the cessation of Federal funding of SEMATECH in 1996,
SEMATECH began reducing its operating budget and initiated
plans for including non-US firms in a set of international
projects. In April 1998, SEMATECH expanded its global
participation and launced International SEMATECH with 15
participating companies, 2 from Asia, 3 from Europe and the 10
US SEMATECH members, however, without Japanese semiconductor
firms as members. From that time on I300I is a division of
International SEMATECH. It will phase out its tool evaluation
activities and will select tools for joint development or
improvement projects. In 1998 for the first time SEMATECH
exchanged information with the Japanese consortium SELETE in
order to develop international standards.
In Japan, SELETE coincides with a new wave of government-
funded semiconductor R&D initiatives. Due to the competitive
crisis in the Japanese semiconductor industry in 1996 a new
MITI supported consortium, the Association of Super-advanced
Electronic Technologies (ASET), located at SELETE's central
facility, was launched to advance the technological frontier
at the design-intensive end of the market. It represents a new
era of private-public collaboration in Japan. 
It may be concluded that the formation of SELETE and ASET is
analogous to the establishment of SEMATECH. Periods of
collective crisis have resulted in collective action that
involved industry-wide coordination and periodically
government-industry action. The new initiatives I300I and
SELETE have been devised and funded by private firms and
government influence was only indirect. 
However, even in the face of unprecedented cooperation between
firms in different countries, the transition to a new
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technology may be impeded by unforeseen events. This
illustrates an important risk associated with the collective
priority-setting and technological forecasting of industry-
wide consortia. 
10.1. Evaluation of SEMATECH.
Although SEMATECH remains controversial, many credit it with
saving US industry's place in semiconductor manufacturing. It
is difficult to separate the influence of SEMATECH from other
changes taking place in the industry and hence to argue what
would have happened without it or what would have happened had
federal sponsorship taken other forms. Although the
improvement in performance of the US semiconductor
manufacturers may be attributable to SEMATECH, there is little
credible direct evidence that SEMATECH is responsible for such
gains.
 
One of the most significant effects of SEMATECH is the impact
on the purchasing habits of US semiconductor manufacturers,
who have increased the amount of equipment they buy from US
suppliers, due to the increased reliability of equipment under
SEMATECH programs. 
It may be objected that SEMATECH was transformed from a
research joint venture into a bailout for US semiconductor
equipment manufacturers. The discoveries made never proved
profitable because demand from US chip producers for the
equipment remained weak. One company, Silicon Valley Group
Lithography (SVGL) even formed a ten-year technology-
development partnership with one of its major Japanese
competitors. In this sense SEMATECH's support for SVGL is a
way for American taxpayers to subsidize a rival semiconductor
equipment maker in Japan.
It has been said (Dick, 1995) that the combination of
unrealized goals, shifting priorities and costly bailouts has
made SEMATECH a resounding disappointment. The consortium had
not at all changed the total R&D spending of its members.
SEMATECH did not raise member firms' returns on assets, did
not raise firms' investment-to-sales or investment-to-assets
ratios, and did not have any appreciable effect on industry
productivity. Own internal company R&D spending was more
productive than investments in SEMATECH. 
The costs of SEMATECH transcended the government subsidies
paid for by taxpayers. In 1992 it has been remarked that
SEMATECH had spent five years and $1 billion but there were
still no measurable benefits to the industry. 
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There are several reasons why SEMATECH failed to be
successful.
First, SEMATECH was devoid of entrepreneurial spirit. It
favored older, more established companies over innovative
start-ups. Many successful small chip manufacturers refused to
join SEMATECH. Put bluntly, consortia like SEMATECH were
formed by people who have lost.
Secondly, the decision not to produce commercial chips
deprived SEMATECH of crucial manufacturing experience through
learning by doing. One cannot go down the learning curve
without manufacturing.
SEMATECH imposed considerable cost for society.
First, SEMATECH refused to allow non-US firms to join its
ranks and blocked joint ventures between members and Japanese
partners. It denied American firms the scientific and
manufacturing advances of foreign competitors.
Secondly, it undermined the longstanding US opposition to
large-scale technology development subsidies of other
countries and it eroded the US authority to oppose and to
persuade trading partners to abandon such subsidies.
Although the US government supported  funding for technology
development activities within the SEMATECH consortium, it
opposed  technology and product development subsidies extended
by European governments to the Airbus consortium. Therefore,
SEMATECH has undermined US legitimacy in opposing foreign
governments' industrial policies and has encouraged the US
semiconductor industry to become insular and protective. 
11. The Position of Europe.
11.1. European weakness.  
The semiconductor sector is the most evident area of European
weakness. 
Throughout the 1970s European  systems companies grew
increasingly dependent on chips produced by US companies.
However, this posed no threat to the European companies
because the intense competition among US merchant
semiconductor manufacturers meant a continuous stream of new
leading-edge products with prices dropping rapidly.
Today Europe must also reckon with Japan (and Asia more
generally). Europe has fallen into third place in the global
electronics competition, suffering dependence on not just one
but two competitive regions.
European producers in 1991 held only 10% of world
semiconductor production, compared to 38% for the US and 46%
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for Japan. 
The European producers hold less than 40% of their own market.
More than 30% of European use is supplied by foreign companies
manufacturing in Europe. The rest is provided by imports. The
trade deficit in active components was $4 billion in 1990 and
in 1997 in high-technology products the EU had a trade deficit
of $25 billion, as shown in figure 21.
Europe did not have an entrenched position in any segment of
the sector. In DRAMs only Siemens remained in the game.
Moreover, the equipment that underlies production is dominated
by Japan and the US.
The positions shifted in favor of Japan in the 1980s and have
shifted back toward the US in the last several years.    
One area of European semiconductor strength is in application-
specific and customized chips that are adapted to particular
market needs and usually made with processes that are not
state of the art. 
Part of the European problem certainly lies within European
companies, i.e. their limited ability to bring new products to
the market, but part also lies in the character of the
fragmented European market which eliminated the potential for
European specialization. Another reason for European weakness
has to do with the national champion policies of European
governments. 
   
Firstly, European firms held back from early adopting cutting-
edge technology. This reflected a low level of demand from the
European computer industry as well as a reluctance to move
away from existing profit centers. E.g., Philips' success with
the germanium alloy junction transistor, the diffused
transistor and the Gunn diode, made the firm conservative and
slow in adopting silicon as a semiconductor material.
Secondly, the fragmentation of the European market into a set
of national submarkets did not allow European firms to produce
on a scale comparable to US or Japanese firms. The creation of
the Single Market benefited American and Japanese firms more
than European ones. They captured the benefits of economies of
scale. The American and Japanese have established extensive
production facilities in Europe in anticipation of
restrictions that would close the market to them. Through
foreign direct investment American companies preempted the
developing European market for advanced products that European
companies could not yet supply.
Thirdly, the "national champion" policies of European
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governments disregarded the fundamentals of competition. 
European governments had a static view of building competitive
strength: large size would ensure success and therefore
governments focused on creating large national champions. But
by so doing they removed many competitive pressures so that
the resulting firms remained relatively weak.
Adherence to a dynamic view might have led to a greater focus
on developing new products rather than creating large firms.  
The European governments did not promote cutting-edge research
or innovation and did not contribute to the creation of new
products. With the exception of Germany's second Electronic
Data Processing (EDP) plan in 1971-1975, basic research was
downplayed in Europe. 
European firms took much of their technology from US and
eventually Japanese firms in the form of licensing and resale
agreements. Where new technology had been created the greatest
weakness in Europe was the inability to successfully
commercialize it. Technology is only a necessary condition for
success in the IT industry. Commercialization is as important
as technology innovation. 
The main difference between the US and European industries was
that troubled firms in the US left the industry, while those
in Europe were merged together and subsidized, leaving the
resulting firm weak.
European policy has made things worse  because support has gone
to those activities that encouraged European firms to compete
directly with American and Japanese firms in the main industry
segment, rather than identifying and entering new niche
markets.  
Overall, the European producers did not appear cost-
competitive, were generally slower and less effective at
establishing new product niches and spent less on R&D than
their Japanese competitors. 
At the moment, the points of leverage and advantage in new
product lines are dominated by the Americans and the Japanese.
The Americans create distinct product definitions, which are
often produced for them by the Japanese. The Japanese often
produce next-generation design improvements, which the
Americans often then distribute under their own labels.
There is seemingly little room for European companies unless
they are able to find new and innovative product strategies
which have to be commercialized successfully.  
11.2. Forms of Protection in Europe.
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The European Commission recognized the strategic role of
semiconductor industry as a key component supplier for the
computer, telecommunication and automotive industries.
European production is considered important for having
alternative supply sources and to alleviate the risk of
dependence on foreign suppliers.
In the early 1980s no urgent sense of crisis seemed to mark
European trade policy. Formal barriers to semiconductor
imports were relaxed a bit. 
For semiconductors there was a common external tariff of 14%
until 1 January 1998. For downstream products such as
computers and telecommunication equipment tariffs are applied
from 4.5% to 7.5%.
In the 1980s tariff suspensions  played a significant role in
IC imports. European chip producers began asking for tariff
suspensions, which for a given period, permitted non-payment
of all or some of the duties applicable to imported goods.
Goods imported under the suspension arrangement enjoyed
freedom of movement throughout the Union. It allowed
enterprises to obtain supplies hardly available in the EU at a
lower cost for a certain period, so that it became possible to
stimulate economic activity, to improve the competitive
capacity and to enable a reduction of consumer prices and to
create employment. The use of tariff suspensions became so
widespread as to effectively open the European market,
reducing the average collected duty to 5 percent of import
value which has been a significant (though not overwhelming)
factor in lowering prices in the European market. Some 20
percent of IC imports benefited from duty suspensions. 
Repeated use has been made of antidumping actions , which have
been initiated by the European Electronic Components
Association (EECA). The investigations concerned DRAMs from
Japan (1987-1990) and South Korea (1991-1992) and EPROMS from
Japan (1986-1991). The investigations ended with positive
findings so that exporters were accused of high dumping
margins. The proceedings were concluded with price
undertakings in which exporters accepted minimum export
prices, while companies not participating were confronted with
definitive antidumping duties. The intention of the price
floor was to provide a "safety net" for European producers, to
encourage them to increase their investments in an environment
free of fear that prices would fall below production costs as
a consequence of cutthroat Japanese competition. A target of
20 percent of the European market for European-based firms has
been mentioned as the desired outcome of the safety net. To
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avoid the negative welfare implications of price floors in
which foreign exporters collect implicitly the duty through
the price undertakings and in order to balance the interests
of producers and users the European Commission set the floor
prices at a relatively low level.
The European price floors differ from the American Fair Market
Value (FMV) system. The European reference pricing scheme
includes a profit margin of 9.5 percent added on full cost,
compared with a 8 percent minimum profit margin used in US-
constructed cost calculations. 
The American system is more stringent in that it attempts to
eliminate soft dumping (selling at prices below one's own
cost, but not necessarily below the cost of more efficient
producers), while the European system is more liberal in that
it bans only hard dumping (selling at prices below even the
most efficient producer's full average cost of production). 
A defender of the American system might reply that it is more
liberal because it permits efficient producers to expand at
the expense of less-efficient producers, while the European
scheme hinders even the most efficient exporting firm by
setting a price above its cost.  
This entire discussion is moot. More important is that an era
is beginning in which different regions of the world are
setting floor prices for key semiconductors using inconsistent
and incompatible pricing formulas.
Antidumping measures against Japan were not particularly
effective in improving the competitiveness of European
producers and in halting the erosion of their world market
share in DRAMs, which fell from 13% in 1993 to 11% in 1994.
Moreover, minimum prices were effectively binding for only a
short period of time during which the market was in recession.
As soon as the DRAM market recovered by the end of 1992,
prices picked up. Antidumping measures against Japan have not
helped to improve the position of EU producers in DRAMS,
although it has spurred increased FDI for DRAM wafer plants.
The large gainers in the DRAM market during the last years are
the South Korean companies with Samsung as the leading
producer.
In the case of EPROMs, European producers have been more
successful, although it is difficult to judge whether this is
due to trade policy. Since 1993, SGS-Thomson has become the
market leader in EPROMs due to its outward orientation.
However, EPROMs will become obsolete and become entirely
substituted by flash memories, a market which is dominated by
Intel and where SGS-Thomson is still a marginal player. 
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In February 1989, the European Commission approved a
regulation that drastically altered the rules of origin  for
chips made in the EU. Although a small change, it had very
large consequences for the origin assigned to chips produced
and consumed in Europe. 
Before 1989, the origin of a chip was assigned to the country
in which the last substantial process or operation that is
economically justified was performed. In practice the location
of assembly and testing was the de facto standard for origin.
Under the new rule, origin is determined by the place of
fabrication, or diffusion as it has been called, (this is the
process by which electronic circuit elements are etched on the
wafer). For a semiconductor to be qualified as a EU product
and to be exempted as a screwdriver plant to avoid antidumping
duties, the wafer diffusion process must be carried out in the
EU. This had triggered off a wave of foreign direct investment
in the EU since 1990.
The major loser was Japan. About 40 percent of Japanese
companies' sales in Europe qualified for national origin based
on the old rules, while under the new diffusion standard only
12 percent of sales qualifies for national origin.   
American producers gained by the change because their share in
European IC sales qualifying for national origin roughly
doubled to 50 percent.
Interestingly, US chip producers, not the Japanese, reacted
most negatively to the change in the rules of origin. 
Part of the answer is that the gains were very unevenly
distributed. The big loser was AMD which did test and assembly
in Europe but had not invested in costly fabrication lines. In
fact some European subsidiaries of US companies had lobbied in
favour of the change in regulation. Another reason is that the
determination of origin internationally virtually took place
on the basis of the testing and assembly standard, so that the
change in Europe seemed to be an open assault on the
prevailing mainstream consensus.
The example given by the Americans of the losses suffered was
the case of a Japanese printer company, being found guilty of
dumping in the EU, that had opted not to use US chips on its
printed circuit boards because of the new rules of origin.
Japanese producers were faced with the requirement to use non-
Japanese components, not European components. According to the
"anti-screwdriver" regulation (designed to prevent
circumvention of a dumping penalty through the minimal
performance of local assembly of imported parts) a 40 percent
minimum level of non-dumped content was required to avoid
dumping penalties.
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The problem remains how to decide the nationality of assembled
printed circuit boards for electronic products on which
semiconductors have been mounted and in which many parts from
many different countries have been assembled.  
It may be concluded that the way protection has been granted
to the semiconductor industry has made the EU a high cost
location for the user industries, slowing down the diffusion
of innovative products and production processes. Protection in
Europe has not helped to reduce significantly import
penetration in semiconductors, nor has it increased the
ability to export. Therefore, it was not in the public
interest to rely on trade policy actions which tended to raise
the cost to the user industries. 
11.3. Unsuccessful European Strategy.
It is interesting to compare the European strategy with the
Japanese one. The European strategy was clearly unsuccessful. 
Firstly, Japan restricted FDI and used import substitution to
create and promote indigenous suppliers. The US could only
benefit from market growth in Japan through licensing and
transfer of technology. 
The European strategy was one of import substitution through
substituting the local production for imports from America. In
essence Europe's policy consisted of trading, i.e.
discouraging, imports for FDI by American companies without
technology being transferred to Europe. 
Secondly, the objective of the Japanese strategy was the
creation of a Japanese industry, whereas the European
objective was the establishment of a European production base,
regardless of ownership.
The Japanese strategy closed the Japanese market to investment
by American companies, reserving domestic demand for Japanese
companies and forcing US firms to transfer technology to
Japanese competitors if they wanted to profit from growth in
that market.
Thirdly, Europe's difficulties in semiconductors were
aggravated by the failure of a promotional policy in the
computer industry. The basic European computer strategy was to
protect national markets with tariff walls and to select
"national champion" firms that were given favored treatment
with direct subsidies and preferential procurement. 
This strategy was a failure, the reasons of which include:
* Being sheltered from competition often meant lessened
pressure to stay technologically abreast in a rapidly changing
market.
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* Being pushed by national policy to go head-to-head against
IBM in existing markets and applications (rather than
identifying and entering new markets) has proved unsuccessful
in the computer industry.
* Alliances to gain access to new technology with US producers
often left European partners stranded with an installed base
of an orphaned technology.
The weakness of the European computer industry implied that
there was a relatively small demand in Europe for the high-
performance state-of-the-art chips that were driving
technology development in the USA.
European chip production focused on discrete semiconductors
and ICs oriented toward the telecommunications market.
European chip-manufacturers placed the emphasis on servicing
the needs of local equipment manufacturers rather than
competing with foreign producers in the more rapidly
developing global markets tied to the computer industry. 
The attempts to protect the European semiconductor and
computer industries from imports have created a vicious
circle.  
* High tariffs and high costs for imported semiconductors
meant higher prices and diminished sales for European computer
systems makers. 
* Diminished computer sales meant a smaller demand for locally
produced semiconductors and this meant greater political
pressure for protection, and so on. 
The Europeans continued to target the computer industry
directly with relatively little support for the semiconductor
industry, while the Japanese promoted the semiconductor
industry directly as a means of building strength in the
computer industry.  
The solution chosen in Europe was to protect the chip market
and to permit free investment within Europe by foreign
producers in order to maintain access to leading-edge
semiconductor technology developed abroad. Only in the late
1980s Europe finally began to develop programs to support the
semiconductor producers.   
11.4. European Management of Dependence .
If in a globalized interdependent world economy technology
would flow rapidly across national and regional boundaries,
there might be no need for European electronics policies. 
However, there is no guarantee that relevant technologies will
be available in a timely fashion within Europe. Therefore, it
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would be best to have evolving technology close to home to
profit from any spillovers, so that local technological
capabilities need to be nurtured within Europe.
Until the end of the 1980s the European semiconductor
producers have not found distinctive solutions that would
allow them to capture powerful competitive positions that
could be translated into standards and proprietary
technologies that could be the base of competitive advantage. 
Europe's dilemma was that American and Japanese firms, not
indigenous European producers were the primary source of
advanced electronics technology.
In the short term the fear was that Europe could not hope to
re-create under European control the various elements of a
sophisticated electronics supply base. Therefore, assuring
leading-edge technology was a matter of securing access to
other regions' supply. 
Europe had to ensure that European producers have market
access to the supply bases of the US and Japan. 
Diversity of supply would be essential to guard against
exploitative dependence; several suppliers in at least two
regions ought to be the policy goal. Europe had to settle for
maintaining alternative regional sources, maintaining a
healthy US-Japan competition by playing suppliers in the
different regions off one another.
The question for Europe was how it should manage this
dependence. 
Should Europe accept free imports of semiconductors to
maintain lower prices, focusing on users and emphasizing
applications know-how, while downplaying concerns about
foreign supplies of technology?
Or should Europe restrain imports to encourage local
producers, even if that involved penalties for the users
employing the products, emphasizing the need for intimate
access to rapidly evolving cutting-edge technology?
In the past, European policies for the diffusion and use of
advanced technology never received the same attention and
weight as did producer-oriented support. The policy debate
emphasized the production of particular products, not the
broad economic gains from widespread adoption of new
technologies benefiting users (computer makers). Not the users
but the producers received the most policy attention.
It was very difficult to establish the appropriate policy
balance between emphasizing user application by adopting new
foreign technologies by allowing imports of components and
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promoting directly the development of particular products.
Now, it is recognized that these two views are complements. A
strong application position can create a foundation for
strength in the production of underlying components. A
dialogue between technology projects and user companies is
required. Integrating users and producers of technology right
at the start of R&D processes facilitates production and
diffusion of technology.
Strength in semiconductors often reflects itself in the final
product markets. Strong final market position in fact creates
semiconductor strength. Final market strengths should be the
basis for formulating a strategy to induce innovation in
supplier industries. 
Highly competitive electronic systems industries require a
strong semiconductor industry and a strong semiconductor
industry needs strong process equipment and material
industries. 
11.5. Technology Policy in Europe .
Only in the late 1980s Europe finally began to develop
programs to support the semiconductor producers. Since then a
growing flow of public subsidies into joint R&D activities in
semiconductors has become increasingly central to the European
strategy for competing in semiconductors. 
The 1983 Megaproject to develop advanced semiconductor
technology played a catalytic role in the creation of the
Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative (JESSI) launched
in 1989, financed by both the public and private sector. The
main purpose of JESSI was to overcome the technological
backwardness with respect to the USA and Japan. The result is
that Europe has closed many of the technological gaps between
its industries and those of the US and Japan, although serious
problems remain regarding market share. While Europe has not
improved in terms of market share, the downfall spiral has
been halted and the European industry is definitely doing
significantly better than in 1987 judged by the difference in
investments made during the last 2 years. 
JESSI's success has been that it has overcome the long-
standing reluctance of European companies to work together
across national borders on fundamentally important research
projects. JESSI has brought Europe's industry back onto the
worldstage by combining resources and pooling risks. On
December 31, 1996 after an eight-year term JESSI ended and
made way for a new European program, Micro Electronics
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Development for European Applications (MEDEA), which is
stronger on the equipment side and more focused on consumer
applications (multimedia, communications and automobiles) than
JESSI and in which user involvement is crucial to getting
technologies to the market. As a four year program MEDEA will
run to the end of the year 2000. Actually it has no budget to
fund projects. It is just a coordinating body. To get the
support of governments its focus is on applications. MEDEA is
focusing on much more finished developments by trying to
combine electronic technologies, systems architecture and
software technologies. There is, however, a three-year wait
between the end of the research stage and the time the first
products appear on the market. 
One of the most important new areas of semiconductor
production in which European companies and research
organizations have developed a leadership role, is system-on-
a-chip technology, in which complete computing capability is
integrated into the silicon circuity. The competitiveness of
the European microelectronics industry relies on the timely
availability of complex systems-on-a-chip. This requires the
vertical cooperation with material and equipment suppliers as
well as with system houses which define the hardware and
software.
European firms have engaged in technology exchange and formed
strategic alliances in R&D with US and Japanese firms. This
may be an effective approach alternative to, or complementary
with, independent cooperative development projects.
However, the increasing globalization of the computer industry
in the form of a two-way flow of technology between European
and foreign firms through acquisitions and alliances may
ultimately undermine both the feasibility and necessity of
European RTD programs. Globalization makes it harder to help
European firms without helping at the same time their foreign
partners because technology leaks away to them. 
At the same time it also enables European firms to utilize
technologies from their foreign partners and strengthens the
research base of the European firms so that programs such as
MEDEA may be less necessary.
12. Evaluation of Strategic Trade Policy.
The case for semiconductors rests on their importance in
maintaining a nation's capacity to innovate and commercialize
technology. As the semiconductor industry is generating
externalities and spillover effects for other sectors it is
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considered to be a strategic sector. 
Therefore, government promotion of strategic industries has
become an increasing common practice among nations. 
This offers strong advantages to first movers due to the
rising cost of developing new technology especially if later
entry is quite limited. Import protection encourages firms to
move further down their learning curve and may act as export
promotion. 
Each national economy wants a preferably large piece of the
same set of high-technology industries that are presumed to be
the guarantors of future high-wage jobs, high-value added
activities and rising standards of living. By pursuing
strategic trade policy, countries want to transfer excessive
returns from foreign countries to their own ones. Due to
spillover effects the overall welfare of the home country may
improve at others countries' expense.
Semiconductors have also been targeted to level the
international playing field, to replicate Japanese targeting
and to safeguard national defense, especially in the USA.
In fact, during the second half of the 1980s, US government
support for semiconductor R&D outstripped Japanese government
support by a ratio of ten to one. 
It must be emphasized that Japan's success in the world market
is not due to unfair trade and industrial policies. The great
Japanese breakthroughs in microelectronics have been driven by
entrepreneurial innovation, not industrial policy.
   
With respect to the defense industry in the US only a handful
of specialty companies produce semiconductor chips used for
defense applications, so that protecting the entire
semiconductor industry is a very roundabout and costly
solution to ensure defense supplies. A cheaper alternative is
to write long-term procurement contracts with the few firms
that focus on the defense market.
Targeting proponents argue that due to spillover effects of
research, firms underinvest in research, so that government
subsidies are needed to encourage firms to increase their
research investment. In fact, however, firms know exactly how
to capture the financial return from their research spending,
e.g., by forming joint research ventures and by negotiating
licensing contracts. On the other hand, the research race
involves some duplication of research efforts so that too much 
investment in R&D also may be a possibility. The problem is to
determine the net effect. Moreover, a policy favoring research
by US firms will equally benefit Japanese competitors because
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technological improvements spill over quickly across borders.
Therefore, it is difficult for governments to help domestic
firms and not their overseas competitors.
Targeting to preserve jobs may save one job at the expense of
another because other industries must purchase higher-priced
inputs. In fact, it has been estimated that for each job saved
in the semiconductor industry by the SCTA another was lost in
computer manufacturing as higher chip prices drove down
computer demand. Moreover, many displaced semiconductor
workers have ready employment alternatives. 
An industry is also deemed strategic if it has the long-term
potential to sustain unusually high profits, perhaps because
it is difficult for other firms to enter the market and drive
down prices. However, actually semiconductor producers have
earned a rate of return that is close to the average for all
manufacturing industries over the business cycle. This is
normal because firms regularly leapfrog over one another to
become the new market leader each time that chip technologies
change. As there are no large profits to redistribute, the
rationale for targeting disappears.
Ultimately, the issue of strategic industries rests on the
users of technology rather than producers. Users of the
semiconductor technology (producers of computers,
telecommunications or consumer electronics) need timely access
from producers of chips to the appropriate technology in terms
of right quality and functionality at a reasonable cost. Since
some set of users will not be guaranteed timely access to the
appropriate technology at a reasonable cost, this has been
counterbalanced by government policies and industry
initiatives aimed at recreating some production capacity
within the nation.
The fundamental reason why targeting fails in high-technology
industries is that they resist central guidance. Industries
such as semiconductors represent industrial democracies that
grow from the bottom up by private initiative, not from the
top down by government directives.
Although governments always try to pick winners, they often
end up supporting the losers. Losers don't deserve support.
And winners don't need it. Therefore, the best trade policy is
to let consumers buy from winners. 
Another great danger of strategic trade policy is that
retaliation and protectionism e.g. in the form of a subsidy
war may come about.
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Finally, there are three considerations which summarize the
costs and failures of targeting in semiconductors.
1) The charges by US firms on Japanese competitors that they
were dumping memory chips during the mid-1980s had as a
primary effect that US users and consumers were hurt by
forcing them to pay significantly higher prices for computer
chips.
2) Japan used these profits to fund research toward the next
generation of chips leaving US firms even further behind.
3) SEMATECH wound up being only a costly bailout of failing US
equipment suppliers.
In Europe production of semiconductors (domestic and foreign
production) has been the result of the common external tariff
on semiconductors which has been eliminated on 1 January 1998.
It was not protection for protection's sake, but explicitly to
get new production investment irrespective of ownership in
Europe behind tariff walls. 
In the USA it happened through the semiconductor trade
agreements, the creation of SEMATECH, through strategic
alliances and through FDI by the Japanese, and in Asia through
a variety of concerted government and business relationships.
In the USA the government supported the chip industry through
R&D contracts and through military procurement especially in
product  technology. In Japan MITI sponsored research in
particular in process  technology.
The aim was to ensure that users of the technology have timely
access at a reasonable cost. It is not unthinkable that this
type of government intervention is going to continue although
its rationale is decreasing.   
13. Productivity Paradox in the USA.
According to the hype of the New Economy, information
technology has the potential to change the way businesses work
and yield a quantum shift in productivity. The reasons
advanced include: production planning is made easier;
inventories can be reduced; delivery lead-times fall and the
nature of distribution is altered. All these factors increase
the flexibilitg of capital goods, making capital investment
more attractive and productive than it used to be and
encouraging firms to substitute capital for labour. All this
should yield soon if not now productivity improvements.
The question is whether the emergence and expansion of the new
high-tech industries is making the economy as a whole more
productive. Robert Solow stated: "we see the computer age
everywhere except in the productivity statistics". To
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substantiate this issue R.J. Gordon produced next table,
applying for the US economy.
1950:2- 1972:2- 1995:4-
1972:2 1995:4 1999:1
Non-farm Private Business 2.63 1.13 2.15
Manufacturing 2.56 2.58 4.58
Durables 2.32 3.05 6.77
Computers - 17.83 41.70
Non-computers 2.23 1.88 1.82
Non-durables 2.96 2.03 2.05
Nonfarm Non-durables 2.68 0.80 1.50
Since 1996 America's non-farm productivity (the benchmark
measure) has improved by 2.2% a year up from a 25-year average
of 1.1%. In the second half of 1998 non-farm productivity (not
in the table) grew by an annual average of 3.4% and during the
first three months of 1999 it grew by 3.5%. Not until
improvements in productivity growth have survived the next
downturn will it be clear that they are permanent
("structural") rather than temporary ("cyclical").
The improvement in measured productivity since the mid-1990 is
surprisingly, extraordinarily concentrated in one small sector
of the high-tech economy: computer manufacturing. As prices of
IT-producing industries declined (by 7.5% in 1997, by 7% in
1996, by 4.9% in 1995, by 2.6% in 1994 and by 2.4% in 1993,
contributing to keep inflation in check), productivity growth
in computer-manufacturing improved at 42% a year between 1995
and 1999. Although computer manufacturing is just 1.2% of
America's output, that improvement was big enough to move the
figures for the whole of the private non-farm economy.
If this improvement can be sustained, many (to be exact a
recovery of 1.02 points equaling 68% of the 1.50 point
slowdown between 1950-72 and 1972-95) claims of the new-
economy enthusiasts may be justified. The new economy
advocates believe that the benefits in the use of computers
(outside of the industries which manufacture computers) has
been long delayed but has finally arrived, in spades. The
claim is that computers are being used efficiently to create
faster growth in the rest of the economy. 
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However, when looking at the final row of the table the
portion of the productivity recovery remaining to be credited
to the nonfarm nondurables is less than when durables are
included. Thus the recovery from 0.80 to 1.50 is not 68% of
the 1.88 ( i.e., 2.68 - 0.80) slowdown over 1950-95 as is the
case for the total nonfarm business economy, but a much
smaller 37% (0.70/1.88).
Examined more closely, the productivity revival, does not
provide any evidence of a broad new economy revolution created
by the benefits of computers and other electronic equipment
spilling over to other sectors of the economy that have
invested heavily in them.
What has been less widely recognized is that the admirable
performance of productivty growth in manufacturing is entirely
located within durables, and within durables entirely in the
production of computers. In fact, the change from 2.03 to 2.05
cannot be called a significant acceleration in nondurable
manufacturing output per hour. 
Therefore, when stripped of computers, the productivity
performance of the durable manufacturing sector is abysmal,
with no revival at all and a further slowdown in 1995-99
compared to 1970-95. There has been no significant structural
acceleration in productivity growth in the 90% of the total
nonfarm private businesss economy located outside of durables
manufacturing. 
The conclusion is that productivity performance of the
manufacturing sector of the US economy since 1995 has been
abysmal rather than admirable (Gordon, 1999). 
The inventions of the late 19th century and early 20th century
were more fundamental creators of productivity than the
electronic-internet era of today. Those earlier inventions may
be classified into four clusters, starting with electricity
(including electric motors, electric light, consumer
appliances), internal combustion engines, motor transport, air
transport, superhighways, super markets, suburbs), rearranging
molecules (petrochemicals, plastics, pharmaceuticals), and
communications-/entertainment (telephone, radio, movies,
television). These big four were much more profound creators
of productivity than anything that has happened recently. Much
of what we are seeing now is second order and does not have
the fundamental impact of the invention of TV and movies and
much of the use of the internet substitutes one form of
entertainment for another.
Therefore, the computer technology has proved unbelievably
effective at reproducing itself; beyond that its apparent
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influence on productivity has so far been somewhere between
imperceptible and adverse. 
A number of explanations have been put forward for the
productivity paradox.
Firstly, computers and information processing equipment are a
relatively small share of GDP and of the capital stock. An
input with a very small share cannot make a large contribution
to economic growth and therefore is not expected to have a
major impact on productivity. In 1994 computer equipment (even
enlarged to encompass all of information processing equipment,
computing software and computer-using labour) accounted for
only around 2% or less of the physical capital stock.
Secondly, software prices have declined less rapidly than
computer prices. Since real computer demand may be said to be
dependent upon the price index of hardware and  software,  
real computer demand growth may be overstated.
 
Thirdly, in particular sectors like finance and insurance,
which are heavy users of information technology, output is
poorly measured and therefore, its productivity effects are
invisible in the data. To the extent that the weight of
services in GDP has steadily increased, overall mismeasurement
also has probably increased. 
Fourthly, the computer facilitates the reorganization of
econmomic activity along the lines of globalization in the
integrated world economy but these gains from reorganization
do not show up in economic statistics.
Fifthly, there is a delay of several decades before
technological breakthroughs deliver economy-wide productivity
gains. Effective use of computers often requires additional
organizational adaptations to the use of computers, which may
not be instantaneous. It takes time and effort for an
organisation to learn how to fully utilise a new technology
and realise any productivity growth. 
Therefore, there are learning cost relating to adopting a new
technology. Because of learning costs associated with the
adoption of new technology, its implementation tends to reduce
productivity in the short term, even though the potential
productivity gain in the long run outweighs this short term
loss. 
E.g., Compaq Computer Corporation, the world's largest PC
manufacturer, estimates that the initial purchase price of a
PC represents only about 20% of the total cost of owning and
operating that PC in a corporate network environment. 
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With such substantial learning costs, upgrading technology
will usually imply a short run loss and long run gain. A new
technology may well seem initially inferior to older methods
to those who have extensive experience with those older
methods; yet initially inferior technology may well have more
potential for improvements and adaptation. This may provide an
explanation for the coexistence of high market value and low
current profitability in IT intensive companies.
Sixthly, factors that are complementary to computers may be
slowly changing so that long periods of time are required to
analyze the impact of computer investment. Organizations are
complex with a multidimensional performance and their inertia
is great for a single innovation to have a substantial impact.
Mere spending money on technology does not guarantee a higher
efficiency. Computerization does not automatically increase
productivity. 
Seventh, conventional price indices fail to capture changes in
quality and thus understate the growth rate for output and
productivity in innovative industries.
Flamm has reinterpreted the Solow productivity paradox as a
semiconductor paradox: You see the semiconductor age
everywhere and not just in the computer industry.
Price indices for semiconductors have dropped more rapidly
than computer prices and semiconductors go into other kinds of
machinery.
Flamm calculated the consumer surplus from declining
semiconductor prices at around 8 percent of annual GDP growth,
which cumulates to a huge number over the 50-year history of
semiconductors.
Flamm estimated the output growth elasticity of demand for
semiconductors at roughly eight times their price elasticity
of demand and his percentage point estimate of semiconductor
contribution to GDP is around 0.2 for recent years. This
number is, fortuitously, similar to the growth accounting
calculations for computers! 
It must be emphasized, however, that many of these issues
around which the productivity paradox revolves are still
unresolved.
14. Present Situation and Future Global Prospects.
Global chip sales have increased dramatically during the
1990s. From $50 billion in 1990, sales jumped to a record $145
billion in 1999, about three times what they were a decade
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ago.  
In 1992 for the first time since 1985, US firms captured the
largest share of the world-wide semiconductor market when they
were responsible for 43.8% of worldwide semiconductor
shipments while Japanese firms held a 43.1% market share.
 
This recovery of US competitiveness derives as much from
weaknesses in the Japanese economy as from refound strength in
US semiconductor manufacturing. 
* The recession in the automobile and consumer electronics
industries is a key factor in the loss of market share by
Japanese semiconductor firms. When the recession ends, it is
not unthinkable that Japanese firms will regain much of the
market share they lost since 1992.
* Of greater long-term concern to Japan is the loss of market
share to South Korean firms which have captured 20% of the
global DRAM market, at the expense of Japanese firms, forcing
the price of DRAMs to new lows.
* An indication of the increasing competitiveness of US
semiconductor producers is the way they have responded to the
most recent period of recession. During the past two years
Japanese firms cut back on capital investment, while many US
producers added to existing fabrication capacity. This will
help ensure large-volume production of the next-generation
microprocessors and other design-intensive products introduced
in 1993 by US firms.
In December 1995, things started to go wrong. 
First, prices started to tumble. The market price of the most
common memory chip, which had been as high as $13 in November
1995, began dropping by more than $1 a month as PC makers
dumped excess stocks after disappointing sales during the
Christmas season. By March 1996 the price was down to around
$9.
Scond, in April 1996, things got worse. The Semiconductor
Industry Association reported that its "book-to-bill" ratio
had dropped to 0.78, its lowest point since 1985. That meant
that for every $100-worth of chips the industry was making,
shipping and billing, it was only taking orders (bookings) for
$78-worth. Since January 1996 orders were below sales. It was
the first time since 1989 that the indicator had gone below
1.0. In February 1996 the ratio was 0.90. This sort of slump
sent businessmen to the window ledge to see what was going on
there. Manufacturers started to postpone planned expansion. In
the first half of 1996, the Philadelphia semiconductor index,
a measure of share prices of American chip makers, had dropped
45%. 
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Both the slump in memory-chip prices and the plunge in the
book-to-bill ratio had their roots in changes affecting the PC
industry. Those changes stemmed primarily from the rise of
software company Microsoft .
In 1995, Microsoft released Windows 95, which needed twice as
much memory capacity. As PC users groaned under the hype
surrounding the new program, chip makers were slavering at the
thought of the extra demand it required. But nothing happened,
or not much. Companies were slow to buy Windows 95, partly
because of associated hardware costs, partly because it was
not clear to them how to use the extra software power, and
partly because Microsoft had another more powerful operating
system, called Windows NT, in the wings. The result was that
many firms decided to wait and see whether to upgrade and did
not buy in the meantime. 
For users of chips the fall in chip prices was a welcome.
However, if memory-chip prices continue to fall, the cash cows
used to finance expansion into everything from PCs and cars to
aerospace would run dry and the cross-subsidisation from
semiconductors would have to stop, which could force firms to
pull back from some markets.
Therefore, to say that no one need to worry about falling
semiconductor prices, is to underestimate how much a shake-out
in the chip industry would matter.
In 1997 world semiconductor sales were $137.2 billion, the
second highest mark in history, representing a 4% increase
over 1996 when the total was $131.97 billion. The moderate
growth in 1997 (+4%), was followed by another steep decrease
(-8.6%) in 1998. 
The world market in 1998 has been valued at $125.6 billion.
The market downturn has been largely affected by the installed
overcapacity, particulary in the memory field, adding to
pressure on pricing. E.g., the 64Mbit DRAM showed a price
erosion of up to 50% during 1998, with an average of 37% at
the end of the year.
In 1997/98 and 1999, semiconductor manufacturers and equipment
suppliers have experienced sales declines largely due to the
Asian financial crisis and excess fab capacity. In 1998
factory utilization rates for total integrated circuits fell
to 82 percent. 
The downturn created surplus manufacturing capacity that
postponed schedules for the transition from 200 mm wafers to
300 mm production facilities. Manufacturing semiconductors on
12 inch (300 mm) silicon wafers instead of the 8-inch (200 mm)
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wafers currently used could increase profits substantially
since 2.35 times more (dice) chips may be manufactured per
wafer. However, the conversion from 200 mm to 300 mm wafers is
expected to cost the industry more than $10 billion in terms
of investment expenditure. For 1999-3 the capacity utilization
was 91 percent. 
In 1999 semiconductor sales were $145 billion representing a
growth rate of 13.5% and they are expected to expand to $172
billion increasing 17.7% in the year 2000. The market is
expected to continue its momentum in 2001 with sales of $190
billion and ending the year 2002 with $215 billion of global
sales.
The facts that DRAM enjoyed high growth during 1991-95 plus
that Windows 95 and Intel's Pentium CPU were released in the
market led DRAM manufacturers to the wrong judgment that the
DRAM market would keep high growth. In addition, Intel's new
venture into motherboard business since 1995 also had a strong
stimulus on the DRAM demand side. Many over-optimistic DRAM
makers translated the sudden growth of DRAM prices into more
investment in constructing DRAM fabs.
However, they neglected one fact that almost all the major
players of DRAM industry had already 8" wafer fabs since 1993;
in 1996, ten more 8" wafer fabs started operation
simultaneously. 
From 1996-98, there were totally 26 new 8" wafer fabs in
operation, which expanded the DRAM production capacity about
20 times of the original 6" wafer fabs if the capacity of an
8" wafer fab is counted as 1.78 times that of 6" wafer fab. 
The anticipation of high growth was shattered by Intel's
dumping of DRAMs to the market and the problem of over-supply
as a result of too many 8" wafer fabs caused an incessant drop
in DRAM prices below average variable cost. No DRAM makers
were spared the harm and all major DRAM manufacturers were
losing money. A reshuffling of players was expected with the
result that only a small number of players would stay in DRAM
business. This would in turn push up the entry barrier and
help to slow down the price drop of DRAM products. 64Mb DRAM
was expected to bear the hope of market recovery. As Windows
98 requires 64 Mb DRAM and supply grows only slowly, it was
perceived that the DRAM industry would have recovered its
prosperity by 2000.  
Everywhere you look these days in the semiconductor industry,
companies are tearing up their market forecasts and coming up
with higher estimates as orders continue to soar. There is no
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doubt the global chip industry is running flat out, at
virtually full capacity. Worldwide fab utilization was running
at 93.6% of capacity in the fourth quarter of 1999. The market
that appears to be at risk of overshooting demand is flash
memory where suppliers will not catch up with demand. 
The main question is whether the soaring chip industry will do
it again: expand too fast during the boom times, creating
overcapacity which ends up pushing the industry into a
downturn? Especially, the pure-play foundries use the current
recovery cycle to greatly expand their capital spending. E.g.,
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.'s capital spending will
be 100% of its sales. That is extremely aggressive, even for a
fast-growing chip maker.  
There are signs that the market for DRAM memory chips could
remain slow for 2001 and 2002. Overcapacity is the main
concern, as more fabs are coming in line with increased
supply.
More concretely, one research house, Advanced Forecasting
Inc., (which has a high record of correct forecasting, i.e.
has called 90% of the IC industry turning points since 1986)
is predicting with an 80% chance a slump in chips and chip-
equipment sales sometime in the second quarter of 2000. It is
speculated that double and triple bookings of orders from chip
makers in November and December 1999 may have led to
unattainable expectations. This could cause chip-manufacturers
to ramp up (i.e. full-blast) production levels beyond what
they actually need and when they can't sell all those chips
expectations will fall, dragging down the equipment makers as
well.
Today the industry is geographically dispersed. New entrants
are flooding in from Asia. And chips are now being used in
more industries than before, making suppliers - apparently -
less sensitive to any one business. However, these changes
have not been enough to flatten out the chip cycle. 
Next table provides an overview over the global IC supply in
percentages by region since 1990.
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  1990   1997   2000
North America   37.5   36.7   35.5
Japan   47.6   35.6   33.8
Europe   10.5   14.9   14.9
Asia Pacific    4.4   12.8   15.8
Source: Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association, 15 July
1999.
Noticeable is the decrease of the share of Japanese vendors as
the Asian Pacific venders took off, while the share of
European and US vendors remained unchanged since 1997.
14.1. European Position.
Despite the severe downturn of the semiconductor world market
in 1996 (-8%), the European  semiconductor market showed a
moderate growth of 1.1% in 1998. All other regions experienced
a strong decline in 1998 from -9.6% for the US to -19.6% in
Japan. The market downturn has been largely effected by the
installed overcapacity, particularly in the memory field,
adding to pressure on pricing. E.g, the 64Mbit DRAM showed a
price erosion of up to 50% during 1998, with an average of 37%
at the end of the year.
 
In 1998, the market share of European semiconductor producers
has grown substantially in all the regions so that the three
major European players - Philips, SGS-Thomson and Siemens -
ranked 8, 9 and 10 respectively. However, the DRAM recovery
has reshuffled the top 10 chip ranking. 
In 1999 only Philips figured on the top 10 chip makers.
European companies tend to put more emphasis upon
specialization and customization of circuits than the rest of
the world. 
The "heavy hitters" Philips, Siemens (as Infineon) and
STMicroelectronics, are still very much up at bat, and they
are hitting with greater impact. For the most part they have
been through make-overs into essentially new semiconductor
companies that are more aggressive, more global and more
willing to take risks on innovative new technology that has
not been proven by circuit manufacturers in other parts of the
world. Europe's semiconductor industry is taking advantage of
its own large and growing consumer markets, has created a new
image for Europe and provides support to European equipment
and materials suppliers of all sizes. If Europe can
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successfully blend its economies under the banner of the euro
currency, it may become the world's largest trading bloc,
pushing the US into second place. The revival of depressed
Eastern European economies could provide an even larger market
for Europe's high-tech products. 
Europe's revival is being driven in part by the strong demand 
for European products for use in consumer products, especially
leading-edge telecommunications and automotive electronics. It
is now easier to raise money for European companies than at
any time in the past. The investment climate for the European
semiconductor business has been improved significantly over
the last year and has given a push for smaller companies to
raise capital through initial public offers (IPOs). Venture
capitalists become interested in investing in small companies,
which benefit much through close cooperation with research
institutes like LETI in France, Fraunhofer Gesellschaft in
Germany and IMEC in Belgium.  
The general public has recognized that the public retirement
system no longer provides adequate financial security, so that
they must take responsibility themselves. The public offerings
of e.g. Deutsch Telecom made the public aware of the stock
markets and the potential for financial gain. The introduction
of the Neue Markt in Frankfurt gave the opportunity to invest
in affordable small cap companies with their focus on
specialized areas of technology. 
The niche marketing approach will dominate technology
strategies in Europe. Europe cannot compete in the high-volume
businesses like DRAMs and microprocessors. Europe has to
deliver ICs tailored to the specific requirements of the
application. Flexibility and close cooperation with the
customer are keys for success. A good example of a growth
market is the packaging industry, which is moving toward the
front end. 
The European semiconductor firms have grown faster than their
international competitors and have become more profitable than
the average industrial firms. They are leading in the
development of next generation technology and have become
dominant in several key global applications markets, such as
multi-technology projects, system-on-chip methodology and
mixed signal/analogue design. R&D and design have transformed
into a major European strength. Now Europe has all the
ingredients for success.
If Europe is to find its place as a significant player in the
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global semiconductor industry this should be based upon a
shift from a business model based on economies of scale and
industrial might toward a new set of competitive criteria
based on intellectual property rather than on capital reserves
to invest in own manufacturing resources. Such shifts are
already evident in the growth of the fabless semiconductor
suppliers and the foundry industry. The development of design
methodologies such as the system-on-chip opportunity which can
be licensed to multiple chipmakers in soft form allows small
IP houses to bring their value-added technology to market
without manufacturing investments. 
Across the European continent partnerships and alliances
between suppliers and customers will become more visible.
Since the semiconductor industry will probably always be
heavily leveraged toward volume suppliers, alliances and
partnerships made possible by a unified Europe actually will
create the required "virtual advantages of scale". 
The recent development of the European share in percentages in
the four regions and worldwide is as follows.
Market      1996       1997      1998
USA       5.8        6.3       6.6
EU      26.3       25.9      28.6
Japan       1.5        1.6       1.8
Asia Pacific      11.7       12.8      13.4
World      10.2       10.8      12.3
Source: EECA, 1999
14.2. Position of Japan.
In 1998, the Japanese semiconductor market faced a strong
adverse wind and experienced substantial negative growth.
Although high growth had suddenly swung to negative growth in
1996, some positive growth was recovered in 1997. However,
this did not lead to full-fledged recovery and 1998 again saw
negative growth. In dollars, the market shrunk by 18.1% from
the previous year to $27.92 billion. The falling trend of the
last several years could not be stemmed and Japan's share of
the worldwide market (in dollars) has fallen from 22.6% in
1997 to 20.1% in 1998. The biggest causes for this downturn
were the decline in domestic production of electronic
equipment due to the significant economic slowdown in Japan
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and Asia and the fall of average unit prices of devices. 
A vicious circle exists in Japan, where worsening corporate
performance has led to wage cuts and uncertainty about
employment. In turn, this has chilled consumption, which
further worsens corporate performance. As a result, the demand
for electronic equipment has shrunk considerably, seriously
dampening the semiconductor market. Nearly all devices have
declined from the previous year. All categories of MOS memory,
except flash memory, are down considerably.
A favorable cycle, in which income growth leads to increased
consumption, cannot be expected soon. 
Full-fledged recovery might begin in 2000 and beyond. This
projection is based on assumptions that corporate capital
investment will increase and income will gradually increase,
leading to gradual expansion of consumption. However, growth
will be lower than the worldwide growth rates and Japan's
share of the worldwide market will continue to decline. This
is largely because the electronic equipment market in Japan is
saturated, unlike those in other regions. Japan's growth rate
will be low because market penetration of electronic equipment
is already high, unlike in Asia where many markets have growth
potential. Japan's share is projected to fall to 16.2% in
2003.
The Japanese semiconductor manufacturing equipment market also
experienced substantial negative growth in 1998, falling by
30.2% on a dollar denominated basis from 1997. This rate of
decline is more severe than that of the worldwide market so
that Japan's share of the worldwide market continued to fall
from 27.7% in 1997 to 24.4% in 1998. The biggest cause for the
negative growth was the severe cutback in capital investments
made by the semiconductor makers because of the stagnation in
the semiconductor market.
With respect to 1999, booking conditions began improving. The
B/B ratio has exceeded the threshold of 1.00 since January
1999 for equipment made in Japan. 
Although the manufacturing equipment market will wipe out
negative growth, this will not likely result in a full-fledged
high-growth recovery. Since it takes several months before
booking recovery is reflected on sales and many makers are in
severe financial difficulties because of the semiconductor
recession, there is little possibility that capital investment
will grow from the 1998 level, which decreased by 37.1%.
The outlook for 2000 depends on capital investment for
building manufacturing lines for 300 mm wafers. If this
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capital investment occurs full-scale, the manufacturing
equipment market definitely will revive. But this will
probably not occur earlier than 2001. For now, Japanese
semiconductor makers are giving higher priority to the renewal
of lines toward circuit dimension reductions than to the
introduction of 300 mm lines. They appear less enthousiastic
about capital investment for 300 mm lines than makers in the
US, Europe and Korea. 
More and more Japanese semiconductor firms are rushing to move
away from DRAM and emphasizing greater efficiency through
moves away from large-scale investments for mass production
toward maximum use of existing equipment and extension of
equipment lifetimes, a shift from quantity to quality, as it
were. 
Concluding, the pace of growth for Japan is slower than the
markets in other regions, so that Japan's share of the
worldwide market will continue to fall year after year, down
to 22.8% in 2002 and to 16.2% in 2003. Japan now represents
the smallest of the four major markets for semiconductors,
trailing North America, Europe and the rest of Asia.
  
However, the country's economic powers are beginning to get
serious about reform. This is witnessed by the NEC-Hitachi
DRAM merger, which is remarkable because it marks the first
time two non-banking Japanese firms from rival keiretsus have
agreed to tie their futures together. Each company will
essentially retain ownership of its respective foundries,
while the newly formed DRAM company will jointly market and
design products that will be manufactured at both existing NEC
and Hitachi plants. Each company's products will be sold under
the new NEC-Hitachi Memory Inc. name. The intention was to
recapture the DRAM championship title from the Korean
companies. But in the next one and a half to two years,
probably out of necessity, the two will combine forces to
invest in 0.13-micron technology, which likely will result in
a new manufacturing facility. Apparently consolidations are a
natural evolution.
14.3. Position of Taiwan.
In Taiwan in the space of just two decades another kind of
Silicon Valley is emerging. Taiwan is a key player in the
worldwide semiconductor industry, ranked fourth in the world
behind the USA, Japan and South Korea.
In the Hsinchu Science-Based Industry Park mainly Taiwanese
home-grown firms which produce computers, IT products and
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integrated circuits are becoming significant world players.
This high-tech cluster has been created as a deliberate matter
of public policy organized and administered by a public-sector
agency. 
Taiwan's semiconductor industry operates in a vertically
integrated structure, which is unique in the world and which
covers design, manufacturing, packaging and testing, along
with supporting industries such as masks, wafer, chemical
materials and lead frame supply. Strong linkage and well-
established cooperative relationships among upper and
lowerstream companies have made the Taiwan IC industry a
highly competitive one. Part of Taiwan's strength lies in the
abilities to form joint agreements with companies around the
world.
The semiconductor industry in Taiwan has been created and
established through a process of resource leverage  (i.e., the
capacity of firms to tap into financial, technological and
other resources to accelerate their entry into new product
markets or to enhance the capacity to upgrade their process
technology) and sustainability  (potential capability of
standing on its own in the face of tough international
competition).
In 1973 an institutional framework under the umbrella of the
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) has been
established with the conscious intention of facilitating the
leveraging of advanced technologies by providing good
infrastructure. In 1974 a specialist semiconductor and
electronics laboratory was opened in ITRI, the Electronics
Research Service Organization (ERSO), which succeeded in
signing a technology transfer agreement with the US
electronics firm RCA. The ITRI/ERSO was the engine for the
rapid diffusion  of (imported) technological capabilities to
the private sector. 
Taiwans's semiconductor output is now well-balanced, covering
the entire range of ICs as well as contract test and assembly
work. This balance allows Taiwan to withstand any downturns
and to continue its expansion. 
Taiwan's semiconductor industry is a flourishing market-driven
strongly export-oriented industry with no nationalized firms.
There are no government "handouts" to any of the firms
although its creation, its nurturing and its guidance have
been entirely the product of government and public sector
institutions. The government offers firms which settle in the
high-tech cluster attractive terms for setting up a business,
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as well as taxation benefits, low-interest loans, R&D matching
funds, special exemptions from tariffs and taxes. Firms which
are accepted as a resident by that fact alone stand a great
chance of raising bank loans for investment. 
Its success as a dynamic cluster ows much to a careful
provision of infrastructure and social services (schools and
medical and health services) as much as to agglomeration
effects. There is now even talk in Taiwan of a reverse brain
drain from the US back to the island.
In 1983 the entry of Korean firms into the memory chip
business forced Taiwan to raise the bar and go all out for
VLSI capability. To this end Philips transferred its existing
VLSI technology to a joint venture with the new company
launched as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
(TSMC). Its success took Taiwan to the level of technical
sophistication and brought Taiwan into the submicron era.
Taiwanese firms that have grown to prominence in the
semiconductor industry have avoided capital-intensive and
standardized DRAMs and instead focused their efforts on a more
diverse range of chips. Many midsize Taiwanese producers have
now abandoned DRAMs and are turning their plants into
specialty-chip foundries. However, few of them have broken
through into own-brand manufacturing. They apply a modified
followership in which they align themselves with a technology,
but then introduce improvements or innovations of their own.
Taiwans' strategies have not acted to constrain their firms'
further evolution, but have in fact provided a powerful
mechanism for becoming inserted in a rapidly changing world-
class high-technology industry. 
The Taiwan earthquake on September 21, 1999, which followed
the massive power failure in July and which hard hit the
Taiwanese semiconductor production, had an impact on the
market. It forced spot market prices to treble in a matter of
days, and although they fell back quite rapidly, once the full
effect was known, the main impact was to accelerate the rate
of rise of contract pricing. However, this rise in spot prices
did not have a big impact on long-term contract prices between
chip makers and PC producers because contracts are negotiated
over a prolonged period. When the spot price for DRAM chips
was below $5 during the second quarter of 1999, the contract
price was at $8-9 and when the spot price was up to more than
$15, the actual contract price was still around $9-13. The
overall impact of the earthquake on worldwide annual DRAM
capacity was under 1%. 
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Taiwan provides up to 12% of all DRAM chips globally and a
third of non-memory chips. Semiconductor equipment investments
are a good indicator of Taiwan's basic intentions in the chip
business. From 1992 to 1998 Taiwan has been picking up world
market share for equipment at the rate of almost 3 percent a
year. As Korean investment faltered, Taiwan surged ahead in
the equipment market and in 1997 it held 14 percent of the
worldwide equipment market, a position South Korea had
occupied in 1995. Figure 22 illustrates this point. 
While Taiwan's industry has made manufacturing wonders,
innovative products are limited somewhat. In order for Taiwan
to have a high-value-added IC industry, it is time for
Taiwan's IC vendors to transform their strategy from investing
in process technology to innovation-oriented product
technology.  
14.4. Position of Singapore.
 
The Singapore semiconductor industry has grown from its
beginning as a back-end subcontracting location in the 1960s
to a fully integrated semiconductor industry employing
cutting-edge technology today. The initial attraction to the
area was low-cost manufacturing, but economic and political
stability, business-friendly government and a highly skilled
workforce have kept foreign capital pouring into the nation.
As of the end of 1998 40 semiconductor companies and 160
supporting companies were operating at all levels of the value
chain.
In Singapore the strategy of high-technology industry creation
has been utilized through leverage  from multinational
corporations rather than via domestic firms and within a
carefully tailored institutional and policy framework.
Leverage is a stronger and more active concept than mere
transfer of technology and gives content to the notion of
spillover effects. The semiconductor cluster in Singapore
spans firms in virtually all steps of the value chain,
covering the IC design sector, IC (front-end) fabrication, IC
test and assembly and ancillary services of equipment and
materials. At the heart of the Singapore story lies that more
and more start-up firms find their business consisting of
contract supply  of essential components and services to
multinationals.
 
The approach pioneered by Singapore was to offer multi-
nationals favorable conditions for location of their
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activities in the host country, with a view to raising overall
skill and technological capabilities. In Singapore it has been
government agencies like the Economic Development Board, and
the National Science and Technology Board that have been the
instigators of resource leverage. They have mapped out the
strategic architecture of the industrial upgrading programs.
The industry, however, remains overwhelmingly foreign-owned
and dependent on MNEs operating in Singapore for technological
upgrading and new product development. 
The Singapore approach was to utilize the MNEs and encourage
them to enter into closer supply relations with local firms
upgrading their operations and capabilities. Singapore has
turned the practice of leveraging skills and technological
knowledge from the MNEs into a high art, pressuring them to
broaden the range of their activities. 
For all its sophistication, there are some weaknesses that may
be remedied as the industry becomes more mature.
In the mid-1990s there were no ICs being produced under the
name "Made Singapore", although many ICs are produced there,
but under others' brand names and under contract to others.
There is not much evidence of indigenous innovation
capabilities, nor is there much evidence of a local private
sector that can add value independently, although contract and
service business is lucrative and in itself technologically
challenging. 
However, there is evidence of determined industry creation and
catch-up efforts mounting in Singapore as well as efforts to
reduce initial dependencies which are created by the leverage
strategy itself. 
Singapore is not just a foreign production site but is
becoming an integrated semiconductor industrial cluster. It is
now attracting the cream of both US and Japanese semiconductor
firms not just to locate their own activities, but to purchase
high-quality wafer fabrication services. There is a supportive
infrastructure including reliable power, clean water and
environmental controls (waste treatment), good training
services and human resource support. There are links with
other industrial clusters such as advanced chemical and
precision engineering firms. Although the output of a spate of
indigenous firms cannot yet match that of the multinationals
the foundations have been laid and the value-added of the
domestic sector continues to expand.
The conclusion is that Singapore's strategy in leveraging its
semiconductor industry from MNEs has been amply rewarded in
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creating an internationally competitive industry. Although the
industry is not yet in a state of sustainability and
independence, it is on a clear trajectory towards such a state
underpinned by the continuous intervention of state agencies.
The case of Singapore is of enormous interest to developing
countries everywhere. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia was one of
the first to emulate the Singapore strategy, then Thailand,
Indonesia and the Philippines, while China provides an example
in the late 1990s.
14.5. The Position of Korea.
In the history of the electronics industry the pace and scale
of the capacity and market share expansion of Korea's
semiconductor industry is unprecedented. Today the Korean
market share of the world wide memory business is about 35%
and Korea represents 12% of the worldwide semiconductor
materials and equipment market.
 
The Korean semiconductor industry was focused on mass
production of high-technology memory products, primarily
DRAMs. 
Because the industry cannot meet the current non-memory demand
trends in both global and Korean markets, all Korean
semiconductor device manufacturers try to diversify their
products from DRAM production so that they can be general
semiconductor manufacturers as well.
In the early 1990s Korea moved from the position of an
insignificant outsider to that of the market leader in DRAMs.
Such a catching-up in this industry is a major achievement.
External and internal factors contributed to this state of
affairs.
Externally:
1) Due to the unrealistically high price floors set for DRAM
imports into the US through the SCTA of September 1986, Korean
producers were able to outprice their Japanese rivals at price
levels that generated substantial profits.
2) In order to tamper oligopolistic pricing and supply
behavior of the Japanese majors, US semiconductor producers
and computer companies created an alternative low-source for
DRAMs and made a choice in favor of Korean producers. 
Internally, firstly, Korea was willing and had the capacity to
spend huge amounts of money on investment and technology
acquisition. Between 1988 and 1992, Korean semiconductor
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chaebol (meaning "financial clique") spent nearly 51% of their
semiconductor sales ($10.2 billion) on capital investment
($5.7 billion). Moreover, Korean semiconductor producers paid
substantial licensing fees for US and Japanese technology. In
1992 and 1993, Korea spent 14% and 16% of its annual turnover
on royalty payments.
Secondly, Korean semiconductor companies used specific
technology acquisition strategies based on three elements.
1) Early on, the chaebol established subsidiaries in Silicon
Valley which served as listening posts for intelligence
gathering on technology and market trends and which were also
used for R&D activities complementing efforts at home.
2) By means of second-sourcing and contract manufacturing with
leading American and Japanese companies which forced the
chaebol to comply with stringent design rules, they acquired
and deepened process technology. 
Although the Korean model was tremendous successful for
catching-up, according to Ernst (1998), it has reached its
limits. A heavy reliance on credit and an extremely unbalanced
industry structure have given rise to a narrow knowledge base
and a sticky narrow pattern of specialization of Korean
companies in high-tech commodities that are characterized by
periodic surplus capacity and price wars. Intensifying price
wars will decrease export revenues, despite a possible
increase in export volumes. 
Korean catching-up has focused on capacity and international
market expansion for homogeneous, mass-produced products with
very little upgrading into higher-end and rapidly growing
market segments for differentiated products and services. The
focus has been on consumer electronics and components with
limited emphasis on industrial electronics, such as in the
more design-intensive sectors of the computer industry. This
leaves Korean electronics firms very little room for price
increases so that there is a constant squeeze on their profit
margins with the result that the funds required for continuous
upgrading may dry up. 
At the same time, there is a drastic change in the rules of
competition: cost reduction needs to be combined with speed-
to-market. Suppliers have to face most of the inventory risk
and the time-to-market pressure by adopting just-in-time
delivery schedules. This requires a significant increase of
upgrading investments at a time of pervasive price wars.
The weakness of Korean firms translated in a limited capacity
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to develop new products and markets. Korean firms in
international semiconductor markets only competed in the
segment of DRAMs. The heavy dependece of revenues from the
demand for computer memories made the Korean semiconductor
industry highly vulnerable, while investment thresholds
continue to grow rapidly. The minimum efficient scale for
producing DRAMs is now more than $1 billion of annual sales.
This implies that only firms that have reached the critical
threshold of 5% of world production can compete successfully.
The very high entry barriers are due less to their R&D
intensity than to an explosive combination of high capital-
intensity, very high economies of scale and an extreme
volatility of demand. Aggressive price reductions have turned
the DRAM business into the "bleeding-edge" of the
semiconductor industry with all leading players experiencing
huge losses. 
In Korea the growth of companies has occurred through octopus-
like diversification  into many different and unrelated
industries rather than through an accumulation of knowledge
through industrial upgrading. Each time a chaebol has reached
the limits of easy capacity and market share expansion for a
particular product, it moved on to a new product group that
promised rapid market expansion without much scope for an
upgrading into higher-end market niches where premium prices
could be reaped. The top five chaebol are operating in some
140 different sectors each. 
This failure to upgrade is one important reason of Korea's
vulnerability to the Asian financial crisis which has reduced
the capacity to generate enough foreign exchange to service
their huge foreign debt.
Furthermore, Korea's semiconductor industry was based on an
extremely weak foundation in terms of the materials and
production equipment required which in the early 1990s had to
be imported for 70% and 90% respectively. This dependence may
be reduced by forming joint ventures with American and
Japanese electronics firms.
Another basic weakness is Korea's very unbalanced
international trade structure in semiconductors.
Korea keeps exporting more than 90% of its total output of
memory chips, while at the same time importing more than 87%
of its domestic demand for microprocessors. This extreme
imbalance between supply and demand makes it very difficult to
broaden and deepen forward and backward linkages within the
electronics industry and to place it onto a more viable basis. 
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In this sense Korea's semiconductor industry represents a
modern version of the classical monoproduct export enclave
with minimum linkages with the domestic economy. 
The key issue for the Korean semiconductor industry is whether
or not it will succeed in broadening its product portfolio and
move beyond computer memories. The prospects are not
favorable. 
Since the early 1990s, there is a disturbing change in the
destination of Korea's exports away from the demanding
American and European markets towards an increasing reliance
on emerging markets within the region. Between 1991 and 1996,
the combined share of North America's and Europe's markets
decreased from almost 51% to 41%. (This holds for Taiwan,
Singapore and Malaysia too.) The implication is that there is
a decline in competitive pressures to upgrade product
performance and quality and that there is less exposure to
sophisticated customers. The increase in internal-regional
trade has become a liability because it provided a perfect
channel for the contagion of the crisis to spread through East
Asia. 
Korea's overall and private sector R&D is substantially below
the critical threshold level required for moving beyond the
technology catching-up stage in comparison with the main OECD
economies. 
Moreover, Korea's quality of the R&D output, i.e. the
effectiveness of technology management is outdated. Korea's
innovation system is characterized by a centralized model in
contrast to the progressive decentralization of R&D in Japan,
the USA and Europe which benefits from continual and numerous
interactions and feedbacks among a great variety of actors
across all stages of the value chain. 
Furthermore, Korea's public innovation system is highly
imperfect. Each Ministry sets up its own program and pursues
its own goals without any coordination.
Korea's educational system is poorly equipped to cope with the
shift in focus to research, product design and market
development. Too much focus has been placed on conformity and
memorization, too little on creativity, i.e. the
identification of new problems and innovative, unconventional
solutions. Korea's low level of higher education has been a
major drag on R&D productivity in Korean firms.
A particularly disturbing feature of Korea's development model
is the high debt-equity ratio of Korea's chaebol of 4 to 1,
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while for the sake of comparison, Taiwan's ratio was much
lower between 1.60 and 1.80. Korea's total debts are estimated
to be twice as large as its GDP of $500 billion. In 1996
Samsung had a debt-equity ratio of 473%. Since equity finance
is more expensive than debt finance because of the need to pay
a risk premium, catching-up requires high debt-equity ratios.
But this makes the financial system highly vulnerable to
shocks that distort liquidity and solvency.
Due to the recession in the world semiconductor market since
1996, the profitability of the Korean semiconductor industry
had already deteriorated even before the Asian financial
crisis. But after the crisis, as their hardship got more
serious, restructuring measures such as mergers or sell-offs
of some business were implemented. 
In order to alleviate overlapping investments among domestic
companies and to strengthen the international competitiveness
of the industry, the government, influenced by the IMF,
engineered "Big Deals", a grand design of merger and business
swaps among the five largest conglomerates.
As part of the plan, a merger between Hyundai Electronics and
LG Semiconductors has been promoted with Hyundai taking
control of the merged company. This resulted in only two major
companies, Samsung Electronics and the newly merged company,
which dominate the Korean semiconductor industry. 
Meanwhile, restructuring of the industry proceeded in other
countries. Micron Technoloy acquired the memory chip business
of Texas Instruments. Throughout Japan, Europe and Taiwan,
many changes such as divestments and downsizing have occurred.
After the merger between Hyundai and LG, four major companies,
Samsung Electronics, Micron Technology, Hyunday/LG and NEC-
Hitachi control about 75% of the international DRAM market.
During 1998, Korean exports of semiconductors in dollar terms
decreased because of the fall of prices due to the oversupply
of DRAM chips in the world market. Accordingly, domestic
manufacturers whose profitability worsened had to accelerate
their business restructuring by downsizing, spin-offs, sell-
off of foreign subsidiaries and foreign capital attraction.
The first year after the currency crisis, i.e. from November
1997 to October 1998, in the semiconductor industry domestic
demand decreased by 14.6% and exports by 3.8%. In the second
year after the currency crisis, i.e. from November 1998 to
October 1999, domestic demand increased by 14% and exports by
13.3%. 
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From November 1998, exports of semiconductors began to
recover. Particularly, the international price rise of memory
chips contributed to an increased rate of over 10% for both
production and export. While demand for semiconductors
increased due to the continuous increase of new PCs' memory
requirements and expanding distribution of low-priced PCs in
the world market, supply has relatively decreased due to
continuous restructuring of the world semiconductor industry.
As a result, the US spot market price of 64M DRAM chips, which
had fallen to the $4 level in early July 1999, rose to over
$10 in October. Specifically, when significant portions of
production were halted by the earthquake in Taiwan in mid-
September, the price of semiconductors once soared to $21
although the price soon returned to its seemingly more normal
level of $12-13.
Though Korea and Taiwan share many similarities, the two
countries have chosen very different approaches. Taiwan's
industrial policy did not discriminate against smaller firms,
while the Korean government directed credit to a handful of
chaebol. In Taiwan small and medium-sized enterprises have
been the main carriers of industrial development. Taiwan's
industrial policy is focused on flexibility and competition
and Taiwan made it easy for new companies to get started and
for established ones to fail. Taiwan's firms found it more
difficult to raise capital for large-scale volume production
and this forced Taiwanese firms to respond more quickly to new
market opportunities. Taiwanese firms cover a much broader
range of products than Korea: they are strong not only in
design-intensive, differentiated products but also in
homogeneous products, which play a much less important role
than in Korea. Taiwanese firms avoid vertical integration and
prefer to rely on complex international production networks.
The fact that key components and engineering talent have to be
purchased on the open market enhances the flexibility of
Taiwanese firms. A heavy reliance on internal sourcing, as in
Korea, might obstruct the capacity for quick response.
While the Korean model was conducive to catching-up, it failed
to develop a broad domestic knowledge base that is essential
for industrial upgrading. Korea has not used its savings
productively in terms of increasing its capacity to learn and
innovate. Compared with other developing countries Korea's
model has given rise to a wastage of capital in this sense
that its marginal capital output ratio in the range of 4 to 5
is too high, judged by its average savings rate of 30% and its
average annual growth rate of 8%. The primary goal of the
chaebol was growth (or sales) maximization rather than
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profitability in order to achieve at top speed a critical 
minimum size at which the government would be unable to allow
insolvency or bankruptcy. Firms raced to the brink of
bankruptcy with one eye fixed on the government to be saved
from going over the edge. The result was a persistent tendency
toward over-capacity.
At this very moment, Korean companies are revving up R&D
activities and diversifying business. They are boosting their
market position with value-added chips, solidifying a niche
position. Samsung has extensive plans to construct Samsung
Valley by constructing a new 1M-square-meter semiconductor
production complex in Hwasung, near its Kiheung headquarters.
Its technological focus aims to the development of 0.10µm
design rule by 2001. Riding on the IT boom, Samsung and
Hyundai began a drive to flash memory chips which are forecast
to emerge as the second largest sector of the memory chip
market in 2000. Samsung's latest developments include the
promotion of system-on-chip. The year 2000 is likely to see
the launch of foundry services. 
Concluding, maintaining their edge in memory devices,
expanding in the non-memory arena and entering the realm of
foundries, for Korean companies the heat is on. 
14.6. Position of China.
The electronics market in China has enormous growth potential.
Today it is only one-tenth the size of the US electronics
market, but over the next 15 years this picture will change
dramatically. The size of the PC market in China is projected
to double in five years and to equal the US market by 2010.
The telecommunications, computers and semiconductor markets in
China are experiencing tremendous growth rates, with many of
these sectors' estimated growth rates ranging from 20% to 40%
annually over the next 15 years. In semiconductors China could
potentially become the world's second largest market by 2010.
Fact is that major barriers remain to foreign participation in
the expanding electronics market in China. China has indicated
that the electronics industry is a pillar industry so that it
is important to its national economic development and
therefore is treated as a strategic sector. To this end China
is heavily recruiting foreign investment from device
manufacturers that could in turn provide sales opportunities
for semiconductor equipment and materials suppliers. China's
central government allows regional and local authorities in
special economic zones the latitude to provide investment
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incentives such as tax abatement and to institute
internationally recognized common business practices. Although
much of the semiconductor industry investment to date has been
in test and assembly facilities, China is increasingly
targeting advanced wafer fabrication technology.
China is still confronted with national security controls set
in place during the Cold War designed to restrict advanced
dual-use technology exports to rogue nations. These controls
have not been substantially liberalized in the past seven
years. Although China is not considered a target country in de
Wassenaar Arrangement of 1995 which governed sensitive exports
in the post-Cold-War world, (with strict controls on
technology shipments on target countries such Iran, Iraq and
Libya) exports of controlled equipment are still subject to
licensing. While the EU and Japan require export licenses for
China, they do not view those licenses as de facto export
restrictions. Conversely, although the US government has not
imposed new controls, under attack by the Congress it is
turning down more licenses. This will hamstring the ability of
US semiconductor equipment suppliers to fully participate in
the Chinese market, unless policy makers in the Clinton
Administration can be convinced that vital economic interests
are at stake. 
In October 1997 China announced to join the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) negotiated under the auspices of
the WTO and thereby to eliminate China's tariffs on
semiconductors. The ITA can be viewed as a free trade zone for
the IT sector. The ITA radically speeds-up the elimination of
tariffs on IT by scheduling their complete elimination for
about 90% of world IT trade by 2000. 
A rapid elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade is
in China's own self-interest because the competitive dynamics
of HT industries demand open markets and it will promote the
development of China's own industry. Policies to promote
national champions behind protected national boundaries will
lead to slower growth of IT activities and will create laggard
domestic IT industries compared to competitive industries
operating in open markets.
If China wants to be a part of the global information society
it will need to eliminate rapidly its tariffs.
The current Chinese tariff of six percent on imports on
integrated circuits offers little protection to domestic firms
that are employing lower level manufacturing technologies
while competitors in other countries are using higher level
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process technologies. 
When a government chooses to try to develop its IT sector
behind tariff walls, the resulting higher prices domestically
will lead to lower demand so that lower tax receipts could
easily offset the increased revenue from the tariffs.  
The six percent duty merely acts as a tax on downstream
industries, such as PCs, that are forced to pay more than
their international competitors for leading edge ICs. The
duties not only do not provide protection for the IC industry,
but they add an extra tax on the downstream PC and other
industries making them less competitive.
Rapid tariff elimination would also reduce the incentive for
importers to smuggle products from Hong Kong.
Moreover, tariff elimination contributes to the transfer of
technology. Granting foreign suppliers trading and
distribution rights enables direct engineer to engineer
contacts between suppliers and customers in designing advanced
semiconductors in electronics systems and this promotes
technology transfer. In this respect too it is in China's
interest to eliminate its tariffs. 
If there is any variation in the staging of tariff reduction
the tariffs on inputs should be eliminated first. This is
because any tariffs imposed on inputs will be an added cost
for every downstream product using these components. According
as China phases out its IT tariffs to implement the ITA, it
should ensure that its tariffs on semiconductors and computer
parts are eliminated first in order to avoid the negative
consequences for its downstream electronic producers. 
Maintaining a presence in China requires the commitment of
foreign companies to contribute to technology and know-how to
the Chinese people. To stay in the good graces of the
government technology companies must give their expertise back
to the local market. The primary purpose is to accelerate the
learning curve of the companies' top local managers.
Therefore, for foreign companies competing in China in-house
MBAs seem to be the rigeur these days. Offering these degrees
free of charge to the executives of their major clients helps
the companies breed customer loyalty and expand market share. 
On May 24, 2000, after some of the most nail-biting days
Washington had seen in years, the US House of Representatives
voted to give China most-favoured-nation trading status on a
permanent basis, known as Permanent Normal Trade Relations
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(PNTR) by a majority of 237 to 197. This will set the stage
for China's membership in the WTO. Passage by the Senate,
which should vote soon, is considered much more of a
certainty. High-tech companies said the vote was the most
important one this year to expand markets in the most populous
nation in the world. The high-tech industry has driven the
booming US economy, accounting for about 44% of recent US
growth. The ability to sustain that growth is dependent upon
fair and open access to world markets, including China. China
is a huge, critical and fast-growing market for all products
and services. Telephone use is expected to grow from 12% of
households to 22% by 2003 and the PC market is growing twice
as fast as the world average and is expected to be the world's
second-largest by the end of 2000. 
In the US, unions, the most powerful anti-PNTR lobby, spent
$2m on advertising and blitzed congressmen. However,
commercial interests fought back. In addition to a massive
advertising blitz, big US companies encouraged their employees
to write letters to congressmen. 
Normalising trade relations with China may help change the
ambivalent attitude of Americans about free trade. This may be
the most important domestic legacy of the PNTR vote. The vote
is important because it has shown that, in contrast to Bill
Clinton's failure to gain fast-track trade-negotiating
authority in 1997, which has cost America credibility in trade
talks, trade bills can actually be passed by Congress. Even
the most ardent free-traders were beginning to question this.
This success reflects a new cohesion between the
administration, pro-trade lawmakers and the business lobby.  
By joining the WTO, China will become subject to the Agreement
on Trade Related Intellectual Property rights (TRIPs), the
best vehicle to combat software piracy. It has been estimated
that in 1998 95% of the business applications software used in
China was pirated, depriving the software industry of nearly
$1.2 billion in licensing revenue. Already, China has enacted
patent, copyright and trademark laws, but their credibility
requires strengthened enforcement.
The Chinese government has agreed to push its state-invested
enterprises, which control a significant share of the trade in
electronics goods into and out of China, to make purchases on
the basis of commercial considerations. Without such an
agreement, there would be a risk that other state-invested
enterprises (i.e.tnose making PCs) would be encouraged by
Chinese officials to buy from domestic chip suppliers.
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China agreed to adopt the Information Technology Agreement,
which will eliminate its customs duties on computers and
peripherals, currently averaging up to 15%, by 2003.
Restrictions on "trading rights" (the ability to import and
export from China) will be eliminated. The current system
forces outside producers to sell through Chinese distributors
and provide after-sales service through a domestic Chinese
entity. The inability to deal directly with end-users has been
a particular problem in the chip industry, where the design 
and development of application-specific chips requires
extensive contact between chipmakers and the ultimate end-
users of the chips.
It may be too much to hope that China will completely avoid
dumping semiconductor devices on the rest of the world, but it
has at least agreed to be subject to the same anti-dumping
regulations as other countries. 
China should be congratulated for realizing they need to make
changes in order to foster a high-tech industry, but they must
realize that their biggest challenge has yet to come:
enforcing the rules to which they have agreed.
14.7. The Position of Israel.
In Israel high technology is increasingly replacing
traditional industrial production. Israel is one of the
world's five top countries when it comes to investment in
research as a proportion of GNP. After the USA, which is
currently registering the largest number of new high-tech
companies, Israel with over 3000 high-tech companies is an
incubator with support centers for start-up firms scattered
all over Israel. The whole success of the Israeli high-tech
sector has been based on an alliance with the major American
players. Israeli companies raised two-thirds of their funds
abroad in 1999, largely from American stock offerings.
However, the money came with a condition. Almost all venture
capitalists are requiring new companies to establish their
headquarters in the US, as a preclude to a Nasdaq offering or
a takeover by an American multinational.
"From oranges to semiconductors" is the slogan that aptly sums
up the dramatic change in Israel's export policy. Now, 80% of
industrial exports and a third of total exports are high-tech
products. 
In 1997, electrical industry exports of $6.7 billion 
consisted of:
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Telecommunications       39.2% 
Industrial and Medical Systems    24.4%
Defense Systems 17.4%
Components 19.0%
It is probably true to say that the military is very much the
driving force of technological progress. Following the Six-Day
War in 1967 and the subsequent embargo which has heavily
endorsed by France, Israel was forced to rely on its own
strength and develop its own high-tech products. 
The result was a massive jump forward in a wide range of
areas, including defense electronics, image processing
technology, radar and telecommunications, process control and
anti-missile systems. 
Although the Israelis are very talented when it comes to
developing products and technology, they lack the right
management culture to become global players. This explains the
importance of working with globally active marketing companies
in joint ventures. 
15. Final Conclusions .
It is very difficult to make the right forecast in the
semiconductor market, because demand and supply has to be
forecasted. On the demand side one needs to know how many PCs
will be sold, how many telephones and how many chips are
required. On the supply side there is the need to know how
many fabs are going to be incorporated in this year and the
year after that. On the demand side there are no great
mistakes, but there are a lot of mistakes possible on the
supply side. The supply side is a function of the amount of
capital that needs to be invested, the yield estimate which is
difficult to predict and the chip size and the number of chips
that can be produced on one wafer.
After a brief return to excess capacity in DRAMs at the start
of 2000, demand for memory is expected to surpass the world's
supply in the second quarter and a shortage may come about for
the next two years. From Seoul to Silicon Valley, high-tech
companies around the world are struggling with an unexpected
problem: surging global demand for electronic things,
especially cell phones, digital cameras and networking gear,
is outspripping the capacity of the world's semiconductor
factories to produce enough parts. That is leading to an acute
shortage of memory chips, driving up manufacturing costs. Some
companies are already paying from 4 to 10 times normal prices
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for certain cell-phone parts. So far the big companies have
resisted passing the increased costs along to their customers.
But if the shortages don't ease up, prices on some industrial
and consumer goods could start to reflect the strain. 
The parts shortage springs from several events.
1) Over the past three years, as the chip industry suffered
one of its worst slumps on record, manufacturers sharply
curtailed spending on new plants. Chip users were partly to
blame: they imposed relentless cost cuts on their chip
suppliers, who in turn took that reduced income out of their
own capital investment and underinvested in capital in 1999.
They were caught by surprise by the strength of demand in the
past six months. In September 1999, investments by chip
companies started to climb again, but the damage was done.
Adding capacity takes 12 to 18 months, so that today's
shortages will likely get worse. Although the parts shortage
is just starting to bite into corporate operations because the
higher prices of key components are eating into profit
margins, it is shifting the balance of power between
manufacturers and suppliers. With demand racing ahead of
supply, the component makers are almighty. They can actually
determine a manufacturers's market share. 
2) Fearful of losing market share, most manufacturers aren't
passing their rising costs along to consumers. Even if
consumers don't suffer price hits, rising component costs are
changing the dynamics of the electronics industry, turning
former winners into losers and vice versa. E.g., Samsung saw
its earnings quadrupple in the first quarter of 2000.
3) The parts drought has not hit all players equally hard due
to smart planning strategies. Large long-term contracts with
chip producers may avoid spot shortages. Finding more sources
for parts over the Internet is another strategy. Re-
arrangement of manufacturing so that parts can be swapped from
slower-selling cell-phone models to more popular ones is a
clever move.
Overall, those with the fattest market share have been the
best insulated and the top-tier players get all the chips they
need. 
The present shortage has triggered a new round of capital
investments by chipmakers of $50 billion in 2000. But much of
that new capacity won't come on line for at least two years.
In the meantime, manufacturers will have to beg and borrow to
keep the assembly lines moving.
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However, some analysts warne that chip markets become
overheated by double and triple orderings of ICs and they
forecast with an 80 percent probability an "elbow", i.e. a
downturn, in the trend line of chips and chip-equipment sales
during the second quarter of 2000. 
Signs that inventories are reaching normal levels again could
be a first sign that there is a pull-back. 
Falling ratios of bookings to billings might be another sign,
although caution is required with this ratio, as explained
above.
Next table presents an overview of recent sales  trends and
projection by market share for regional markets in
semiconductor devices, with dollar values in billions.
   1997    1998    1999    2000
World   $ 137   $ 125   $ 168    $172
Americas     34%     33%     33%     32%
Japan      23     21     22     22
Europe      21     23     20     22
Asia/Pacific      22     23     25     24
Source: World Semiconductor Trade Statistics, in Electronic
Business, July 1999.
For the equipment market the picture looks as follows.
Equipment Sales trends by Regional Market.
  1997   1998    1999    2000
World   $ 27   $ 22    $ 20    $26
Americas     33%     34%      35%     35%
Japan     26     22      20     21
Europe     11     14      13     12
Asia/Pacific     30     30      30     32
 Source: Semiconductor International, July 1999.
The common theme in industries from aviation, railroad and
automobiles to semiconductors, is that their initial phase was
dominated by efforts to improve performance and to lower cost.
A second phase in those industries was characterized by
product refinement and diversity, what is now starting to
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      DSP is a foundation technology deserving the title2
"breakthrough" with the power to transform broad areas of the
electronics industry. The DSP is a single-minded specialist
dedicated to a single group of tasks, racing through a smaller
range of functions than a more general purpose microprocessor. The
goal of DSP is to use the power of digital computation to manage
and m odify the signal data permitting an exactness of measurement
and control impossible in analog systems. When the DSP has finished
its job, the digital information may be turned back into an analog
signal that is better than the original. DSP chips are engineered
to handle enormous streams of real-world information, such as
images and sounds and process them in real time. Its impact is
being felt in applications as diverse as stereo systems, cars, PCs
and c ellular phones. Its functions include filtering noise from a
signal, removing unwanted interferences, amplyfying or suppressing
certain frequencies, or make internal organs stand out more clearly
in medical CAT scans. DSPs can restore vintage jazz recordings to
their o riginal clarity and enable satellites to pick out
terr estrial objects as small as a golf ball and help squeeze more
conversations onto crowded airwaves. The DSP literally performs
hundr eds of millions of operations per second at lightning speed.
The mar ket for DSP chips is growing at twice the rate of the
semiconduc tor industry as a whole. The PC era was all about data
processing, but now the post-PC era of signal processing is
entering. By 2010, every microprocessor will have DSP.
  
happen in chipmaking. Companies are shifting their use of
technology from lowering manufacturing costs to enhancing
product lines. All these industries managed to prosper in
spite of higher manufacturing costs. 
Industry watchers believe the IC industry is now in the early
stages of an era of consolidation, characterized by the
" inverted pyramid ". However, the full effects of this
evolutionary trend may not be readily apparent for another
five to ten years. It should be noted that the emerging
inverted pyramid is IC product-specific. E.g., in the Digital
Signal Processing (DSP) area , Texas Instruments held 472
percent of the total 1998 market and the top four companies
held a 96 percent market share. This market share make-up is
definitely "top-heavy" and therefore resembles an inverted
pyramid. Other IC categories may be more or less defined by
the inverted pyramid structure. 
Figure 23 illustrates the inverted pyramid.
In the future most major segments will become more like the
current DSP market, where the shares held by the top producers
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leave very little for remaining competitors. The most
significant effect of the future inverted pyramid situation
will be the inability to second-tier companies or startups to
break into the top rankings. The barriers to entry will be too
formidable for new startups or second-tier companies to
overcome. Such barriers include financial resources, process
or design capabilities, patent protection, etc. Thus each
major IC product segment ultimately ends up in the control of
a few companies. 
The message to the large IC producer is that in order to have
a good chance of being successful in the future he must be a
leading supplier today.
As the competitive framework within each IC product segment
evolves toward a few major suppliers, pricing pressures will
lessen and increased profitability for the leading companies
in each key product area will result. The strong will get
stronger.
Next table presents the 1998 rankings in key IC product
segments which represent almost two-thirds (65%) of total IC
industry sales of $ 109 billion in 1998.  
Product segments Number of Market Inverted
firms share tendency
DRAMs        6      77%     High
Flash Memory        6      81%     High
32-/64-bit MPUs        4      90%     High
Analog        6      52%     Low
Pure-Play Foundry        4      90%   Moderate
Standard Cell        6      90%     High
MOS PLD        6      90%     High
DSP        4      96%     High 
Source: IC Insights, Channel Articles, 11 January 1999, Vol.
12, No.6.
It is expected that the number of major players within each IC
product category and their market shares will continue to
display the inverted pyramid characteristics.
Not all of the eight categories listed are expected to show
the same degree of inverted pyramid tendencies, as is shown in
the final column. Since the analog market is so diverse in
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product make-up as well as end-use applications, there is more
room for companies to select and be successful in various
niche markets within the analog category. This is evident from
the relatively low 52 percent market share held by the top six
producers.
Therefore, over the next five years consolidation through
mergers and acquisitions may characterize the industry.
However, disintegration tendencies are also suggested in this
sense that middle-sized vertical companies will not have the
volume to justify continuously building new fabs and thus may
become foundries or design houses. 
Semiconductors have been the most productivity-enhancing,
life-changing technological revolution since the harnessing of
steampower in the 18th century or, in the 19th, of electricity
itself.
It may not be long before the semiconductor industry plateaus.
The pace of transistor integration will decline and
manufacturing costs will begin to soar. In a more mature
industry, growth will almost certainly come from refined
products in more diversified lines. Information storage will
keep moving forward. Even in the semiconductor industry,
maturity can be a splendid asset by giving computer
architectures and software time to begin assimilating the
great leaps in chip performance. 
There are signs of two big changes.
1). Within the semiconductor industry itself. Chips have
become just any other commodity. From the point of view of
national economies, it matters little where they are made,
provided that they are available to be cheaply bought.
What matters more is how they are subsequently used.
2). For the first 20 years or so of micro-electronics, the
applications for the new technology seemed obvious. The
potential applications seemed as boundless as the human
imagination. But the trouble is that the imagination does have
bounds. The computational power has outstripped useful
applications for it. E.g., initially people were reluctant to
buy Microsoft's new operating system, Windows 95, which
required more memory than most home computers possessed. And
consumers seemed to have decided to forgo the marginal
improvement the software provided. 
Moreover, the consumer-electronics industry must now struggle
to dream up new "killer applications" as lucrative as personal
stereos and video recorders. 
The computer is now in the early throes of a new phase of its
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revolution, as it becomes more an instrument of communication,
less of computation. A machine that transforms communication
impinges far more radically on people's lives than one that
transforms computations. It is people's willingness to embrace
it that matters most. 
In any case the semiconductor business is about to go through
a period of wrenching change.
A final prediction is that Japan will continue to fight neck-
and-neck with the USA for number one position, but their
cumulative relative weight will be progressively reduced.
However, for the very next future the market share for Japan
and North America is expected to remain fairly constant.
The major change will be in the relative positions of the
Asia/Pacific region and Europe.
By the start of the decade Asia/Pacific will probably overtake
Europe to become the third largest semiconductor producer.
Europe although in fourth place, will have a bigger market
share than today, which is expected to grow to 15 percent
during this decade. 
China is expected to become one of the largest markets in the
world. China is currently estimated to be an $8 billion per
year semiconductor market. The PC market alone has tremendous
opportunities for dramatic growth. E.g., in the US, there is
one personal computer for every three citizens, in Brazil,
there is one PC for every 70 people and in China, there is
only one PC for every 400 people.
  
Globalization has become a reality in the international
semiconductor industry. Interrelationships between firms have
grown to such an extent that it has become totally irrelevant
to use a single measure to assess the market share of the
contribution of different countries/regions to the global
market. There is no single measure  of the chip market telling
the whole story:
- Not world exports because they exclude sales within the
market in which they are produced.
- Not sales because they exclude the internal use of chips in
vertically-integrated firms.
- Market shares based on world exports differ from those based
on ownership. E.g., US share in world exports in the early
1990s was 18%, while its share based on company ownership was
32%. Asia/Pacific exports to the world 38%, while is owns 19%. 
However, under the SemiConductor Trade Agreement of 1986 the
nationality of a product had been determined by the producer's
headquarters, not the location of production. Therefore, a TI
chip produced in Japan was counted as American and a Hitachi
chip produced in the US was counted as Japanese for the
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purpose of calculating market shares.
Given the borderless nature of many operations in this
industry, the era in which it makes sense to distinguish the
nationality of a chip has long since passed.  
The role of strategic alliances spanning R&D, product
development, production and distribution has grown enormously
over the past and will continue to increase functioning as the
most important mechanism for technology transfer in the
semiconductor industry. The advantage of strategic alliances
is that there is no government money involved so that there is
no requirement to share the technology with other companies
how much or how little they bring to the party. In strategic
alliances each of the parties will benefit from the results of
the investment in technology development and are not required
to share with everyone else in the country.  
The number of alliances between companies is increasing and
the majority of alliances is formed between companies in
different economic regions. Most alliances are between
companies in developed countries for the purpose of developing
technologies and products, i.e., the promotion of R&D and the
exchange of technology. Alliances with companies in emerging
Asia are increasing and tend to be for production objectives
in the form of formal joint ventures.
Next table presents figures about the change in the regional
dispersion of alliances from 1981-1992.
US-US US- US- Japan- Japan- Europe- US/Europe/
Japan Europe Japan Europe Europe Japan/Row
1981- 0% 0% 83% 0% 0% 17% 0%
83
1984- 10% 5% 36% 3% 10% 23% 13%
86
1987- 25% 14% 11% 2% 11% 17% 20%
89
1990- 9% 25% 24% 0% 10% 7% 25%
92
 
The emergence of successful global alliances has the potential
to shift competition away from the current, predominantly
nationalistic focus to a struggle among competing global
partnerships. These partnerships will likely form the basis
for a series of global semiconductor "camps", each centered on
the process-technology capabilities of two or three global
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firms linked to a multitude of smaller, allied producers. 
There will be networks of companies from the USA, Europe and
Japan working together. It is these networks of companies that
compete which each other without government involvement.
The primary axis of competition will not be between the USA
and Japan, but between competing camps of global producers.
Coopetition or cooperating to compete has arrived in the
industry with a vengeance. Coopetition has become common in
this industry because users want to know in advance that a
broad range of companies will support a given technology. This
helps markets grow faster, without requiring prolonged periods
to shake out competing technologies. Coopetition often
involves companies agreeing not to battle in one market even
as they fight like dogs in others. Companies compete on actual
products and cooperate on technical standards sacrificing a
degree of independence to increase the odds of success for the
technology as a whole. Of course, coopetition makes antitrust
authorities nervous if competitors agree not to compete. 
Given the steady flow of announcements of strategic alliances,
partnership agreements, joint development programs and the
growing number of mergers and acquisitions, the age of
coopetition has gained such momentum that this business news
overshadows the technology news of the sector. This new age of
coopetition takes many forms which fall into three groups:
equipment and materials companies are teaming up with each
other on specific new developments, with their customers and
with universities, consortia and other research organizations.
At first the focus of such cooperation was on precompetitive
development efforts and was funded through consortia such as
SEMATECH and a host of other such organizations that sprang up
around the globe. Previously device manufacturers often built
their own costly in-house equipment development teams for fear
that an outside vendor might inadvertently share processing
secrets with competing semiconductor companies.
But two primary factors fueled a change. 
* One was the reality of rising development costs of the
transition to 300 mm wafer production which could no longer be
absorbed into the unit price of finished chips. As development
cycles shorten, high-yield processes must be implemented in
manufacturing in the first place and capitalizing on the
expertise of strategic partners is a useful way to achieve
this goal. 
* The other factor was the rapid globalization of the industry
that made obsolete the concept of competing along geographic
lines. 
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The final conclusion is that in the future the model for the
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